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First Amendment
Limitations on Tort Law*
David A. Anderson'
I. INTRODUCTION
Most First Amendment law has developed in response
to restraints on speech imposed by statute, local ordinance, or
agency regulation. Typically, the restriction arises from the
words of a statute or rule, and therefore is relatively fixed,
specific, and readily identifiable. It usually issues from the
executive or the legislature - government actors who
historically have been the villains in the great dramas that
produced our free speech traditions. Because some entity of the
state is normally a party to the litigation in which the
restriction is challenged, the state is present to offer its
interpretation of the restriction, explain its objectives, and
answer objections to the means it has chosen. When the
challenged restraint is a tort judgment, though, the situation is
rather different. The threat exists not within the corners of a
document, but in the operation of the common law, the
articulation of which is scattered, incomplete, possibly
changing, and sometimes contradictory. Often the content and
effect of the common law is itself being contested in the very
proceeding in which its constitutionality is to be decided. The
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instigator of the particular threat to speech is a private litigant
and the governmental actor is the court that is asked to provide
a remedy. No other agent of the state is present, so the job of
speaking for it is left to the plaintiff and the court. To the
extent the court takes on this responsibility, it is both advocate
and judge. As the voice of the common law, the court identifies,
articulates, and defends the state interest served by the
challenged rule, and as guardian of the Constitution the court
judges the rule's validity.
So far the Supreme Court has minimized these
differences, insisting that they do not affect the Court's role.'
Indeed, the Court often adopts more aggressive remedial
strategies in tort cases than it employs in other types of First
Amendment cases.' When the Court decides that a statute or
regulation violates the First Amendment, it normally does not
tell the legislature or regulator what it must do to make the
measure constitutional.' In tort cases, however, the Court
usually undertakes to correct the constitutional problem itself.
This results in the displacement of tort law by federal
constitutional law. The most conspicuous example is the law of
defamation, in which the Court over the past forty years has
progressively replaced much of the common law with federal
constitutional rules. To a lesser extent, it has done the same
with the law of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
invasion of privacy, and interference with trade relations.
Whether this is good or bad, one might expect that it
would at least occasion some discussion. If the Court had
undertaken in Gratz v. Bollinger to tell the University of
Michigan how to revise its undergraduate admissions practices
to meet the demands of the Fourteenth Amendment, that
surely would have provoked a lively conversation, probably
within the Court but certainly outside it, about the wisdom of
the undertaking and perhaps about the boundaries of the
Court's power. But similar undertakings in connection with
First Amendment limits on tort law have generated little
discussion.
1 See infra text accompanying notes 51-55.
2 See infra Part V.
3 With respect to statutes, even when the First Amendment is involved,
conventional wisdom is "that a federal court should not extend its invalidation of a
statute further than necessary to dispose of the case before it." Brockett v. Spokane
Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 502 (1985).
4 One important exception is Professor Richard Epstein, who questioned the
wisdom of constitutionalizing large portions of defamation law and recognized the
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My objective here is to explore the theoretical and
practical implications of the Court's predilection for prescribing
solutions to tort-speech conflicts.' I come to this as an outsider
to the more general discussions among constitutional law
scholars about federalism, judicial power, and constitutional
decision making. Those debates are extraordinarily rich and
are highly pertinent to this issue, but I believe a more specific
perspective, from the intersection of tort law and First
Amendment law, also has something to contribute. I am
generally a fan of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence,
but also a tort lawyer who believes tort law has a role to play in
the resolution of tort-speech conflicts. I argue in this Article
that the differences between tort law and other types of
restraints on speech are more significant than the Court has
acknowledged, and require more care in the choice of
methodologies and remedies than the Court has sometimes
exercised; that the Court should attempt to preserve as large a
role for the common law as the demands of the First
Amendment can tolerate; and that accomplishing this may
require the Court to be less eager to offer its own solutions to
tort-speech conflicts.
Part II of this Article describes a gulf between the
assumptions and methods of First Amendment law and those
of tort law, which makes it difficult to square the demands of
the First Amendment with the methods of tort law. Part III
explores the nature of the state's involvement in tort cases and
concludes that it is different, in ways that matter, from the
more familiar forms of state action. Part IV considers the
possibility that tort law's burdens on speech, which are to some
extent inevitable, may be inherently incompatible with free
speech - if not generally then at least in some particular torts.
Setting that possibility aside without conclusively rejecting it,
Part V explores ways of reconciling tort law with the First
Amendment and Part VI suggests steps the Supreme Court
should take to preserve a role for state courts.
complexity of the task. See Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan
Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 786 (1986) ("If the tort of defamation represents a
delicate balance, then the Supreme Court should tread carefully where so many
common law judges have trodden before."). Another is Professor Monaghan, who
touched on a number of the issues discussed here in his important article, Henry P.
Monaghan, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
5 The Religion, Association, and Assembly Clauses of the First Amendment
may also impose limits on tort law, and those might raise similar issues. But I am
concerned here only with limitations arising from the Speech and Press Clauses.
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I should mention a couple of preliminary matters here.
The first is the range of torts to which this discussion applies.
Many of the illustrations I use arise from defamation. That is
the tort in which the First Amendment limitations are most
familiar and most fully developed. However, it is by no means
the only area to which this discussion applies. In fact,
defamation is the area of speech-tort conflict that I have the
least hope of influencing. The constitutional limitations on
defamation are so entrenched that it is hard to imagine the
Court abandoning them. But there are other speech torts, such
as privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
interference with trade relations, in which the Court's
approach does not yet appear to be solidified, and yet others,
such as trade secret law and physical harms caused by speech,
that the Court has not addressed at all. Even if it is too late to
change course in defamation, other paths are still open in these
other branches of tort law.
By "speech torts" I mean torts in which the claim arises
from the content of speech that would be fully protected by the
First Amendment if it were not tortious.' This discussion may
also have some application to torts arising from the content of
speech that is not fully protected, such as obscenity or
commercial speech,' and to tort claims that do not arise from
the content of speech but may impact speech, such as claims for
intrusion or trespass.' But the core issue I wish to discuss here
is First Amendment limits on tort judgments that arise from
the content of otherwise fully protected speech.
6 Some of this speech could be held to be fully protected even if it otherwise
would be tortious, of course.
See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (2002), cert. dismissed as
improvidently granted, 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003) (holding that corporation's
representations about its labor policies could be actionable under the Deceptive
Practices Act because they were commercial speech).
8 For example, the Supreme Court in Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514
(2001), held that the First Amendment precluded liability for disclosing conversations
that the defendants knew had been taped in violation of federal wiretapping laws. The
Court conceded that the liability was not content-based, but said it was
unconstitutional because it penalized the publication of truthful, lawfully obtained
information.
If the tort did not involve such information, it might be governed by Cohen
v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991), which held that the First Amendment poses
no obstacle to liability based on generally applicable laws that have incidental effects
on the ability of the media to gather and report news. The theory of liability in that
case was promissory estoppel, but the principle presumably could apply to torts that do
not target the content of speech.
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The second preliminary involves the adoption of a
shorthand vocabulary. The choice I am exploring is between
deciding questions as a matter of federal constitutional law and
deciding them as a matter of state tort law. For simplicity's
sake, I employ the term "Supreme Court" as shorthand for any
court deciding as a matter of federal constitutional law, and
"state court" for any court deciding as a matter of state law.
These must be understood as terms of art, because the matter
is not quite that simple. The tort law in question is invariably
state law,9 as to which only state courts are authoritative.
Federal courts in diversity cases decide state tort law issues,
but only as they believe the courts of the state would decide
them, so I include in the term "state courts" federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction."0 The Supreme Court has no
power to decide questions of state tort law, for reasons I
explain in Part IV, so its role in speech-tort cases is only to
apply federal constitutional law. Of course other courts, both
state and federal, can decide federal constitutional questions
too, and conceivably the Court could give state courts a larger
role, as a matter of constitutional law, in devising new First
Amendment limits on tort law. To avoid having to use language
that includes all these possibilities throughout the Article, I
proceed as if the choice is between the Supreme Court and the
state courts (as for most practical purposes it is), trusting the
reader to keep in mind the complications mentioned here.
II. TORT LAW AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARE UNEASY
BEDFELLOWS
A First Amendment challenge to a tort judgment is a
clash of divergent legal cultures. The advocates speak different
languages and embrace different faiths. The culture of First
Amendment jurisprudence seeks precision and predictability
(even though it often fails to achieve these), insists on narrow
9 There is some federal tort law. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (recognizing federal wrongful death action for negligence in
maritime law); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing federal tort action for violation of constitutional rights
by federal agents). But these federal torts rarely, if ever, impact speech.
'0 Because of the general rule that the assertion of a federal constitutional
defense does not create federal question jurisdiction, see Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989), most speech-tort cases tried in federal court are
predicated upon diversity jurisdiction and therefore are controlled by state law, with
the federal court applying state law and attempting to interpret the common law as the
state's highest court would interpret it.
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remedies, and distrusts juries. Tort law embraces broad,
flexible principles that aim not so much to prescribe outcomes
as to provide structures by which outcomes can be decided,
usually by juries, in a manner that is more than a little ad hoc.
Substantive First Amendment law frequently demands
that remedies be narrowly tailored." In some contexts this is
only a gentle insistence that there be "a reasonable fit" between
the state's ends and means; 2 in others it requires the state to
show that there is no "less restrictive means" of achieving its
objective, 3 a demand that often is all but impossible to meet.
However it is applied in the particular context, the
requirement always embodies a certain amount of hostility to
broad-gauge remedies. Its purpose is to authorize courts to hold
a remedy unconstitutional not because it is inappropriate on
the facts of the case, but because the state has cast its net too
broadly.
Statutes may violate the First Amendment because they
could be used to discriminate on the basis of content even if
there is no evidence that that is their purpose." They can also
be held unconstitutional because they give a government
official too much discretion even if there is no evidence that the
discretion has been exercised improperly." In all these
instances, the regulation is held unconstitutional not because it
has been shown to have had an impermissible effect on speech,
but because it might do so.
First Amendment law pursues precision not only
through its generally applicable principles, but also through
the special doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness. Because of
the hostility to overbroad laws, even if the speech at issue in a
particular proceeding could be restricted consistently with the
First Amendment, the restriction may be invalid if, on its face,
it also reaches speech that may not be restricted.'6 Accordingly,
1 See, e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 539-41 (1989); Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596, 608-09 (1982); Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Super. Ct. of Cal. for Riverside County, 478 U.S. 1, 9 (1986). The enthusiasm for this
requirement is not unanimous. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124-25 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (attacking the demand for
narrow tailoring in First Amendment analysis).
12 Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 470 (1989).
13 Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1988).
,4 See, e.g., Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984); Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 446 (1991); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983).
15 Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 757 (1988).
16 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97 (1940).
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the court may be required to evaluate not just the restriction's
application to the specific speech in question, but also its
apparent applicability to other speakers. 7  An ancillary
principle, which has large implications for tort law, is that an
overbroad restriction cannot be saved by state courts'
assurances that they will not permit the restriction to be
applied in ways that would violate the First Amendment; 8 a
narrowing construction can save the restriction only if the new
construction on its face precludes impermissible applications.'9
Additionally, restrictions must not be vague. A
restriction on speech is unconstitutional if persons "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application." ° The First Amendment tolerates less
vagueness than does due process generally.2 Restrictions on
speech must be precise enough not only to prevent the
excessive deterrence that may result from uncertainty about its
reach, but also "to eliminate the impermissible risk of
discriminatory enforcement."22
1 See, e.g., Bd. of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569
(1987) (holding regulation unconstitutional because of its effect on protected First
Amendment activity without considering whether plaintiffs activity was
constitutionally protected).
18 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (holding that case-by-
case invalidation of unconstitutional aspects of regulation would insufficiently protect
First Amendment interests).
'9 See Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 964-
65 (1984) (holding that ordinance must be invalidated in its entirety, even though in
some applications it might be constitutional, because partial invalidation would not
leave a "core of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable conduct").
United States v. American Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 123 S. Ct.
2297 (2003), seems to have observed this principle largely in the breach. As an answer
to an overbreadth claim directed at a statute that denied federal funds to libraries
unless their Internet access terminals employed pornography filters, the plurality
accepted the Solicitor General's assurances that libraries may eliminate such filters at
the request of an adult patron. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the
"overblocking" effects of the statute could not be cured by a mechanism that was not
made mandatory by the statute and was subject to discretionary application. 123 S. Ct.
at 2315 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Possibly the apparent departure from the usual
insistence on certainty that the narrowing will occur is explained by the fact, which the
plurality emphasized, that the statute "does not 'penalize' libraries that choose not to
install such software" but "simply reflects Congress' decision not to subsidize their
doing so." 123 S. Ct. at 2308.
20 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964).
21 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (holding that, in First
Amendment cases, vagueness doctrine "demands a greater degree of specificity than in
other contexts").
22 Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1051 (1991). The Court
emphasized, "The question is not whether discriminatory enforcement occurred here,
and we assume that it did not, but whether the Rule is so imprecise that
discriminatory enforcement is a real possibility." Id.
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Vagueness and overbreadth are rovers, designed to
catch First Amendment infringements that might otherwise
get through the regular lineup of First Amendment defenses.
Together, the two doctrines are meant to require the
legislature (or regulator) to be precise - to make sure not only
that no protected species are caught in its net, but also that the
restriction makes clear in advance which unprotected species it
aims to catch.' These doctrines are enforced somewhat
unevenly,24 but they do sometimes demand even more precision
than substantive First Amendment doctrines alone would
require.
Tort law does not co-exist easily with those principles."
Its focus is post facto, on what actually did happen. It is
inherently imprecise. This imprecision is most obvious in the
familiar basic principles of negligence law, which ask whether
the defendant failed to use the degree of care to be reasonably
expected of a person in the same or similar circumstances,26
whether that failure was more likely than not a cause of the
plaintiffs injury,27 and whether that injury or something like it
was the kind of harm whose risk made the defendant's act
negligent.26
Of course, negligence is rarely the basis for tort liability
arising from speech. Liability usually rests on one of several
more specific speech-tort theories - theories that may be less
indeterminate than negligence law. But these also impose
liability on the basis of concepts that are more general, broad,
and vague than First Amendment law normally tolerates.
23 Overbreadth and vagueness both "recognize that litigants are entitled to be
judged according to permissible standards - both before and after courts decide to trim
any provisions in a statute." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1031-32 (2d ed. 1988).
24 See id. at 1026 (noting a trend to place "a mounting burden on the
individual to show that the apparent inhibition of protected expression is in fact highly
probable and socially significant").
25 My colleague Doug Laycock once urged a similar point to the Supreme
Court: "Modern tort law is designed to compensate widely and generously; it is
predisposed to impose liability. First Amendment law is designed to protect
controversial beliefs, speech, and religious practices; it is predisposed to avoid liability."
See Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae National
Council of Churches of Christ et al. at 12, Int'l Soc. of Krishna Consciousness of Cal. v.
George, 499 U.S. 914 (1991) (No. 89-1399).
26 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
PRINCIPLES) § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
PRINCIPLES) § 28 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
'8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
PRINCIPLES) § 3 & cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001).
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Whether a disclosure of private facts is actionable as invasion
of privacy, for example, depends on whether the disclosure is
one that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and
whether the fact disclosed is a matter of legitimate public
concern.' Whether intentionally inflicted emotional distress is
actionable depends on whether it is severe and whether the
means by which it is inflicted are extreme and outrageous.°
Speech that intentionally induces another to breach a contract
is actionable if the interference is "improper.""
The most familiar source of tort liability for speech is
defamation, which contains its own elaborate limitations to
protect speech, and which one might therefore expect to be
more precise and determinate. But for all its detail and
complexity, even the tort law of defamation employs a number
of concepts that are likely to strike the First Amendment
lawyer as far too imprecise. A statement is defamatory if,
considering "the fair and natural meaning which will be given
it by persons of ordinary intelligence,"" it tends (at least in the
eyes of "a substantial and respectable minority" ' of the
community) "to so harm the reputation of another as to lower
him in the estimation of the community or deter third persons
from dealing with him."' It is not actionable if it is
"substantially true"" (or, in cases in which the burden of proof
has been switched as a matter of constitutional law, unless it is
"materially false"") - that is, whether it "would have a different
effect upon the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded
truth would have produced."" Whether defenses of privilege are
available depends on such questions as whether the publication
is a "fair and accurate" account of a proceeding,' or whether
the defendant acted in bad faith' or circulated the report more
Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
3' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §766 (1979).
32 Hermann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 138 A.2d 61, 67 (N.J. App. Div.
1958).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. e (1977).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. f(1977).
36 See Rouch v. Enquirer & News, 487 N.W.2d 205 (Mich. 1992).
37 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
See, e.g., Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1981).
39 See, e.g., Potts v. Dies, 132 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (holding privilege lost
if defendant acts with bad faith or with a bad motive).
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widely than necessary. ' ° These are all questions of judgment
that lack the predictability, certainty, and precision that First
Amendment law usually demands.
In tort law the jury's role is central."' Most tort doctrines
are aimed at shaping the issues for the jury. Tort law severely
limits the role of judges, both trial and appellate. The judicial
role is largely supervisory, and nearly all final substantive
questions are committed to the jury. Much effort is expended
allocating responsibility between judge and jury,2 usually with
a view toward preserving the jury's ultimate power to decide.
In contrast, a central tenet of First Amendment law is
distrust of juries. The jury, once thought to be the chief
protector of free speech,43 is now considered one of its chief
threats." The Court has made its First Amendment limitations
on tort law effective primarily by limiting the jury's power. In
defamation, the First Amendment takes away much of the
jury's power to find actual malice,45 presume harm, 6 and
determine what is defamatory.47 It diminishes a jury's power to
decide when public figures should be able to recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress" or when disclosures
of private facts should be actionable as invasion of privacy.49
40 See, e.g., Galvin v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 168 N.E.2d
262, 265-66 (Mass. 1960) (holding privilege forfeited by excessive publication).
4' DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 33 (2000).
42 Id. at 36 ("Many of the tort rules and practices seen in this book can be
understood as taking one side or another about the jury's appropriate role.").
43 See JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF
JOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 23 (Stanley Nider
Katz ed., 1963) (describing Andrew Hamilton's successful argument that the jury had a
right to return a general verdict). "The propositions that truth should constitute an
adequate defense and that the jury should decide the whole question of libel were to
become the heavy cannon of the embattled libertarians of the eighteenth century."
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 128 (1985).
44 For an argument that this reversal of assumptions about the jury is a
logical result of changes in threats to free speech, see 2 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON
DEFAMATION § 16.5.5.2, at 16-47 to 16-50 (3d ed. 1999).
45 See infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
46 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (disallowing
presumed damages unless actual malice is shown).
47 See Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (holding as a
matter of law that, in the context in which it was made, an accusation of blackmail
could not be understood as a charge of crime). What constitutes a defamatory
statement is one issue on which even common law courts often limit the jury's power by
holding that the statement is as a matter of law incapable of a defamatory meaning.
See, e.g., San Francisco Bay Guardian, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1993).
48 See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
49 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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The cultural differences between tort and constitutional
law flow naturally from the different purposes they serve. In
tort law, telling people what they should do is a secondary
enterprise; whatever effect tort law has in guiding conduct
arises from what it does post facto in the course of adjusting
losses. Precision, clarity, and certainty therefore seem, at least,
to be less important than they would be if tort law were in the
business of explicitly prescribing conduct. Constitutional law is
in that business, however; it exists to tell government actors
what they must or must not do, and the importance of clarity
and certainty are therefore obvious. Tort law is majoritarian
(or perhaps populist): It assumes that lay people are at least as
likely as judges to make good decisions on many of the
questions that ultimately determine tort liability. Because of
its countermajoritarian purposes, that assumption is
unavailable in much of constitutional law.
That is not to say all the differences are inevitable.
Maybe tort law is too backward-looking; perhaps it should
attach more importance to its prescriptive role and therefore
strive for more certainty and predictability. Maybe juries are
not as good as judges would be at deciding tort liability issues,
and maybe constitutional law should be less
countermajoritarian. My purpose here is neither to defend nor
condemn the differences, but only to describe them and suggest
that they play an important role in speech-tort conflicts.
III. "THE STATE" IN SPEECH-TORT CONFLICTS
There is no doubt that tort judgments are state action
and therefore are subject to First Amendment limits. It has
been clear at least since Shelley v. Kraemer' that a state court's
application of common law principles is state action. Since then
the proposition has never been seriously questioned, and it
seems clearly correct. If it would be unconstitutional for a court
to impose a judgment at the command of a statute, a judgment
that lacks a statutory basis can hardly be less objectionable. In
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,"1 the case that applied the
First Amendment to a tort judgment for the first time, the
Court said:
50 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that state court enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants was state action violating the equal protection clause).
51 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to
impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech
and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil
action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by
statute. The test is not the form in which state power has been
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been
exercised.5
But the exercise of state power in a civil case applying
only common law is different from the state action that the
First Amendment normally guards against.' Eventually the
Court acknowledged that "a suit by a private party is obviously
quite different from the government's direct enforcement of its
own laws,"' but it still did not address the consequences that
might flow from those differences." Whether tort judgments are
state action is only the beginning of the inquiry; the
substantive constitutional law that becomes applicable because
of that determination raises many questions in common law
cases that do not arise in the more familiar forms of state
action. Those are the questions I address in this section.
A. State Action in Tort Cases is Different
The tort judgments at issue here are content-based. The
general principle concerning content-based restrictions is that
"the government cannot limit speech protected by the First
Amendment without bearing the burden of showing that its
restriction is justified."' Some types of speech, such as perjury,
misrepresentation, incitement to imminent unlawful violence,
solicitation, and extortion, seem to be excepted from this rule;
regulation of these apparently is at least presumptively
12 Id. at 265 (citations omitted).
At the most obvious level, if the courts that apply common law in civil
cases are state actors, then in other contexts there are at least two state actors. One is
the legislature, prosecutor, government agency, or governmental body whose action is
alleged to have violated the First Amendment; the other is the court that is asked to
enforce or affirm that action.
Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
55 The Court merely reiterated the reason for treating tort suits as state
action: "Nonetheless, the need to encourage debate on public issues that concerned the
Court in the governmental-restriction cases is of concern in a similar manner in this
case involving a private suit for damages. . . ." Id.
56 Phila. Newspapers, 475 U.S. at 777. See also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 120 (1991); In re Alexander Grant & Co.
Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 355-56 (11th Cir. 1987).
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constitutional."7 But unless such an exception applies, a
restriction on speech is generally presumed to be
unconstitutional,' the burden of justification is on the state, 9
and uncertainties about the effects of the restriction on speech
are resolved against the state.' The presumption of
unconstitutionality that seems to apply to these cases (at least
unless the tortious speech is shown to be false) is of the sort
that requires strict scrutiny."' Thus, "[Ihf a newspaper lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order.""2
This method of First Amendment analysis is not used in
all speech-tort cases; defamation cases, for example, employ
quite a different methodology. Whether the generic strict-
scrutiny analysis is an appropriate method in any of the tort
cases implicating speech is a fair question.' But it is the
default method, the one used until the Court devises some
other methodology, and it is the one that offers the clearest
view of state action in speech-tort cases.
If it is "the state" or "the government" or "state officials"
who must defend restrictions on speech against First
Amendment challenges in tort cases, what state entity bears
the burden of articulating the state's interest and justifying
57 See generally KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF
LANGUAGE (1989).
58 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 115 ("[A] statute is presumptively
inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers
because of the content of their speech.").
59 See, e.g., Ark. Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)
("[Tihe State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.").
60 See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575 (1983) (holding tax unconstitutional despite argument that it actually
discriminated in favor of newspaper).
61 In First Amendment jurisprudence, "strict scrutiny" is somewhat more
variable than in equal protection analysis. It can require proof of something like a clear
and present danger, see, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding
that advocacy of violence protected unless it is directed to, and likely to, produce
imminent lawless action), or proof of a compelling state interest that cannot be
accomplished by less speech-restrictive means, see e.g., Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S.
105, or it can simply establish an unspecified "heavy presumption" against the
constitutionality of the restriction, see N.Y. Times Co., v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
714 (1971) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
6' Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail
Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979)).
63 See infra text accompanying notes 79-89.
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the restriction? It can only be a court, because no other
incarnation of the state is involved. Is it the trial judge who
must shoulder those burdens? Possibly so; the only act that has
real consequences for the parties is the judgment,' and there
are cases in which the Supreme Court speaks of the judgment
or the result as the relevant state action.' Even under this
conception of the state action, however, the state actor could be
either the trial court that entered the judgment, the appellate
court that affirmed it, or both. The question has some practical
relevance in connection with the scope of appellate review. If it
is the trial court that bears the burden of justification, the
appellate court could confine itself to evaluating the adequacy
of the trial judge's justifications rather than accepting that
burden itself.
Usually, however, the Court identifies the state action
somewhat more broadly, as the "state rule of law"' or "the
application of state rules of law in state courts." 7 In these
broader conceptions of state action, all the courts that had a
hand in creating the common law tort in question would seem
to be state actors.' There could still be questions as to which of
their voices count, however. The reviewing court might think it
necessary to consider everything that all of these courts have
said by way of articulating the state's interests and justifying
the tort, or it might think the only relevant voice is that of the
court that brings the common law rules produced by all those
other courts to bear on the specific case - namely, the court
whose decision is being reviewed. 9 Again, the question has
Of course, First Amendment issues arise and have to be resolved during
and even before trial, before there is a judgment. Perhaps state action at that point
could be thought of as the potential judgment. The judge could be seen as answering a
hypothetical question: "If I were to enter judgment rejecting the First Amendment
argument, would that be a state action abridging speech?"
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988) ("this award");
Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 526 (1989) ("this result").
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) ("state rule of law").
67 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991). See also Time, Inc. v.
Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 376 (1967); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916
n.51 (1982); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986). Sometimes the
Court doesn't seem to distinguish between the state rule of law and its application by
the courts to the case at hand. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975)
("exposing the press to liability").
To the extent that the common law in question really is common, this
presumably would include the out-of-state courts that had a hand in creating the
relevant tort principles.
69 Occasionally the Court looks to a later articulation by the same state court.
See Time, 385 U.S. at 380-85 (1967) (accepting the construction given a statute by New
York Court of Appeals in a case decided while the Hill case was pending in the
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practical consequences for the scope of appellate review. At the
Supreme Court level the answer is fairly easy, at least in
practice: The Court evaluates the interests and justifications
that have been relied upon by the court below, and perhaps
additional ones advanced by the parties, but does not canvass
decisions of other courts of the state (or other states) for
additional ideas. For state supreme courts, however, the
answer is not so easy. Since they are the ultimate expositors of
the common law, they may feel that they must look beyond the
offerings of the parties and the court below.
If a tort judgment is presumptively unconstitutional and
the burden is on the state to justify it, and if "the state" is a
court, that court finds itself in an unusual position. It is both
the arbiter of the dispute between the parties and the defender
of the state's interest as expressed in the common law upon
which the plaintiff relies. This is quite different from the
court's role in the usual non-tort First Amendment case. In
those cases we do not think of the court as the entity that poses
a threat to free speech; the relevant state actor is the official or
official entity whose act the court is reviewing. The court's role
is to weigh the free speech implications of some other state
actor's agenda, not to defend its own. In tort cases, it is not
quite clear how the challenged judgment should be viewed. Is it
the disinterested decision of a court that should be assumed (in
the absence of contrary indications) to be as eager to protect
free speech as the Supreme Court? Or should it be viewed like
any other act of "the government," whose speech-suppressing
tendencies have been demonstrated throughout history and
against which the First Amendment must be ever vigilant?
The point is not that courts cannot be both decision-
makers and advocates. In any area of law, they are rarely
entirely neutral. In non-First Amendment cases, for example,
courts are often required to give deference to legislative
judgment, which puts the court, at the outset at least, in the
role of defending the legislature against the party attacking a
statute." In every case, one side or the other bears the burden
of persuasion, and to that extent the court is aligned with the
Supreme Court). See also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 10 n.5 (1990)
(looking to an intervening decision to determine how the Ohio courts interpreted the
First Amendment's application to opinion in defamation cases).
70 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (defending
Congress's determination that farmer's production of wheat for home consumption
affected interstate commerce).
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other side. In criminal cases, for example, the court is supposed
to be the defender of the presumption of innocence." And at
some point in every case, the court ceases to be neutral and
becomes a defender of its decision and often of the law on which
the decision is based. Opinions (of trial courts as well as
appellate courts) often read more like briefs than dispassionate
analysis and explanation.
Nor is the point that courts cannot be threats to freedom
of speech. Many branches of First Amendment jurisprudence
reflect a belief that courts are threats to freedom of speech, or
at least are not reliable protectors of it. If courts were not
themselves capable of threatening free speech, there would be
no need to include injunctions in the presumptive prohibition
on prior restraints"2 or to limit courts' power to exclude the
press and public from their proceedings.73 The point is only that
a court's role is unusually complex when it is both the sole
state actor and the decision-maker that is asked to decide
whether the state action violates the First Amendment.
When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged in a
proceeding to which the state is not a party, most states (and
the federal government) require that the attorney general be
notified and given a chance to intervene." The obvious purpose
is to give the state an opportunity to defend the challenged
statute. I have found no comparable requirement for cases in
which the state is not present to defend the constitutionality of
a common law rule. That may reflect a belief that the court will
adequately represent the state's interest in such cases, but it is
71 See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (reversing criminal
conviction because of judge's failure to protect defendant from prejudicial trial
atmosphere).
" Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546, 558 (1976).
73 Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia., 448 U.S. 555, 562 n.4 (1980).
74 See 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (2000); ALA. CODE § 6-6-227 (2004) (as interpreted by
Landers v. O'Neal Steel, Inc., 564 So. 2d 925 (Ala. 1990)); ALASKA R. Crv. P. 24(c);
COLO. APP. R. 44; CONN. R. APP. P. § 63-4(a)(7); HAW. R. APP. P. 44; ILL. SUP. CT. R.
19(a); KY. R. CIV. P. 24.03; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:4448 (West 2003); ME. R. Civ. P.
24(d); MASS. R. CIv. P. 24(d); MINN. R. Crv. P. 24.04; MiSS. R. Civ. P. 24(d); MONT. R.
Civ. P. 24(d); NEV. R. APP. P. 44; N.H. SUP. CT. R. 31 (2003); N.J. CT. R. 4:28-4(a), (d);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 1012(b) (McKinney 2003); N.D. R. Civ. P. 24(c); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 2024(D) (West 2004); PA. R. Crv. P. 235; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 24(d); S.C. R. Crv. P.
24(c); S.D. R. CIV. P. § 15-6-24(c); TENN. R. Civ. P. 24.04; VT. R. Crv. P. 24(d); W. VA. R.
CIv. P. 24(c); WYO. R. CiV. P. 24(d). Some other statutes do not mandate notification,
but give the court discretion to decide whether notice is appropriate. See ARK. R. CIV.
P. 24(c) ("the court may require that the Attorney General of this state be notified of
such question"); KAN. R. Crv. P. 24.03 ("court may in its discretion notify the chief legal
officer of the state"); MICH. R. Crv. P. 2.209(d) ("the court may require notice be given to
the Attorney General").
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not clear why that should be assumed if the court cannot be
counted on to defend a statute.'5
B. Discharging "the State's" Burden
Ultimately, of course, it is the plaintiff who bears the
burden of defending the state's decision to provide a tort
remedy and the terms on which the remedy issues. The public,
the court, and the common law may have generalized interests
in maintaining a body of law that protects reputation, privacy,
or physical security, but only the plaintiff has a specific stake
that will be lost if the state's interest is not successfully
defended. In tort cases, the basic principle of First Amendment
law referred to above"6 must be revised to say "the plaintiff
cannot succeed without bearing the burden of showing that the
restriction on speech is justified."
In a sense, placing this burden on the plaintiff is
natural and inevitable. All plaintiffs ultimately bear the
burden of convincing the decision-maker that they deserve a
remedy,77 and that may include the burden of showing that
their desserts outweigh the costs that liability will impose on
the particular defendant, other potential defendants, and the
world at large." But the generic strict scrutiny model of First
Amendment law imposes a different kind of burden. It requires
the tort plaintiff to justify more than her own case. The
hostility to overbreadth and vagueness, the insistence that
remedies be narrowly tailored, and many of the substantive
doctrines of First Amendment law require the court to look
beyond the case at hand to the effects that liability might have
on other speakers. The tort plaintiff therefore must show not
75 Perhaps it reflects uncertainty as to what state official would be an
appropriate defender of the common law. Although that role might not be as familiar to
attorneys general as defending statutes, I do not see why they could not be asked to
perform it. How zealously they would defend, or whether they would do so at all, is
another question, but that is also true of their defense of statutes.
76 See supra text accompanying note 56.
71 See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 94 (Little, Brown, &
Co. 1923) (1881) (asserting that letting injuries lie where they fall is a central principle
of the common law).
7' These are the kinds of burdens many tort plaintiffs face in establishing
duty. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 41, at 582 (2000) (stating that duty is constructed by
courts from the building blocks of policy and justice). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 7 cmts. c-g (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002)(identifying the following as appropriate factors in determining the existence of duty in
tort cases: social norms, effects on other bodies of law, relationship between defendant
and plaintiff, administrability, and effect on other governmental decisions).
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only that a judgment in her case will not unjustifiably abridge
freedom of speech, but also that the tort scheme she invokes
will not unduly abridge speech in other cases. She must defend
not only the tort's application to her, but also its potential
application to others.
The significance of this burden can best be appreciated
by observing it in action. In Florida Star v. B.J.F.7 the sheriffs
department erroneously released the name of a rape victim and
the defendant newspaper published it while the assailant was
still at large. The woman received several phone calls from a
man who threatened to rape her again. Both the sheriffs
department and the newspaper acted in apparent violation of a
criminal statute forbidding the disclosure of names of rape
victims in instruments of mass communication. The woman
brought a civil suit against both for their violation of the
statute. The sheriffs department settled for $2,500. The
woman won a $100,000 jury verdict against the newspaper.
The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the
remedy the state had provided her was not a narrowly tailored
response to the interest in protecting rape victims' privacy."
The reasons were that: (1) liability for publishing information
the government itself had made available would be especially
likely to result in media self-censorship;1 (2) liability for
violating the statute under principles of negligence per se
bypassed issues that might have helped the defendant in a
common-law action for invasion of privacy, such as whether the
victim's identity was already widely known and whether the
defendant acted negligently;82 and (3) the state had failed to
apply its prohibition evenhandedly because the statute applied
only to media of mass communication and thus would not cover
disclosures of the name through gossip.'
It is not clear that any of those objections were actually
applicable to B.J.F.'s claim. First, the judgment did not
threaten to induce either the sheriffs department or the
newspaper to self-censor, because both had policies against
disclosure of rape victim's names and both said they had
violated those policies inadvertently in disclosing B.J.F.'s
79 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
o Id. at 538.
81 Id. at 535-36.
82 Id. at 539.
0 Id. at 540.
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name.' Second, it is difficult to see why a common-law action
might have produced a different outcome than negligence per
se: In order to obtain punitive damages she had proved that the
defendant was not merely negligent, but had "acted with
reckless indifference to the rights of others," and there was no
indication that anything other than the newspaper story had
made her identity known.' Third, in addition to the negligence-
per-se remedy based on violation of the statute, Florida
recognized a common law action for invasion of privacy, which
presumably would have applied to gossips or other nonmedia
sources who disclosed B.J.F.'s name."
The irrelevance of the objections to the case at hand is
the natural consequence of applying general First Amendment
principles to tort cases, because under those principles the
question is not the effect on the defendant's speech. The
problem was not that B.J.F.'s favorable judgment unjustifiably
burdened the newspaper's speech; it was that the state had
chosen "too precipitous a means"' of protecting her. She lost
not because she deserved to lose, nor even because allowing her
to win would abridge free speech. She lost because the Court
believed the terms on which the state extended its remedy
would allow too many others to win, and that would abridge
free speech. As in most speech-tort cases, it was the predicted
effect on other cases that made the judgment unconstitutional.
Articulating the state's interest in protecting
reputation, privacy, and emotional and physical security, and
justifying the state's common law remedies as narrowly
tailored methods of doing so, are not familiar roles for either
plaintiffs or state courts. Most plaintiffs probably assume that
if they can find a common law tort that affords a remedy for
their injury, and if they can meet the requirements of that tort,
they will win unless the defendant carries the burden of
showing that such a result would be unconstitutional. They are
mistaken, of course; once the defendant asserts a First
Amendment defense, the burden effectively shifts to the
84 Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 528, 536.
85 Id. at 529.
Id. at 528.
87 See Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir.
1962) (holding that plaintiff stated valid common law invasion of privacy claim against
media defendant under Florida law).
88 Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 537.
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plaintiff to justify the remedy.' State court judges also take the
common law remedies as a given; their opinions rarely contain
elaborate articulations of the state's reasons for protecting
interests like reputation and privacy. They may feel moved to
advert to the long history of defamation as evidence that it
protects an important interest, or to the rapid acceptance of the
privacy protection once Warren and Brandeis proposed it, but
it generally does not occur to them that they need to write
opinions that are capable of convincing the Supreme Court of
the need for, and appropriateness of, the common law
remedies. They are not accustomed to writing exegeses that re-
examine the purposes served by these remedies and the
possible availability of other methods of achieving those
purposes. But that is the role that either the plaintiff or the
state court must accept under the analysis that casts either or
both of them as "the state."
These difficulties can be alleviated somewhat by
adopting a method of First Amendment limitation other than
generic strict scrutiny. For example, the constitutional law of
defamation consists of an elaborate doctrinal structure of
substantive and procedural rules. Judgments that satisfy these
rules require no further First Amendment analysis,
presumably because the Supreme Court in devising this
doctrinal apparatus has already applied something equivalent
to strict scrutiny, albeit at a more abstract level, and has
decided that the common law of defamation as modified by the
prescribed constitutional rules is a narrowly tailored means of
achieving a sufficiently important state interest. The
advantage of this prescribed-rules methodology is that once it
is fully developed,' the prescription tells plaintiffs and courts
in advance what First Amendment hurdles a tort judgment
89 This is clearest in cases like Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524, in which the courts
apply a generic form of First Amendment strict scrutiny. It is less obvious in cases that
employ more particularized constitutional rules, such as defamation cases, but
something similar happens there too. In those, the plaintiff has the burden of
satisfying Court-created surrogates for strict scrutiny, such as actual malice.
90 During the time the prescribed rules are being developed, they do little to
relieve plaintiffs and state courts of the burdens described above. If the Court in
developing such rules is engaging in a more abstract version of strict scrutiny, the
plaintiffs in those cases and the state courts whose judgments are being challenged are
in more or less the same position as the plaintiff and state courts in Florida Star, 491
U.S. 524. Whether the state's remedy (and the plaintiffs judgment) survives depends
on their ability to persuade the Court that the burden imposed on speech is justifiable
(or at least that it can be made so by a lesser rather than a greater constitutional
limitation).
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must clear. Its disadvantage is that it puts the Supreme Court
in the business of deciding tort-like questions and calcifying
those choices as constitutional law - the practice I question in
this Article. Whether the predictability gained by the
prescribed-rules methodology outweighs this disadvantage is a
question to be considered in Part IV.
IV. TORT LAW'S BURDENS ON SPEECH
A. Some Deterrence of Speech is Inevitable
If the objective of First Amendment law is to assure that
no protected speech will be deterred, all tort law is a threat.
Deterrence is one of the objectives of tort law, and law never
achieves its objectives perfectly. No matter how carefully tort
law is calibrated, speakers can rarely be certain that they will
be immune from liability. There will always be some
uncertainty as to what the common law is, what version of it
will be applied to a particular set of facts, or whether the court
might decide to change it. Unless juries are removed from the
process entirely, there will always be doubt as to how the jury
will evaluate the facts and apply the law. Even if judges made
all the decisions, some of this doubt would inevitably remain.
The deterrence that arises from uncertainties about
outcomes is compounded by uncertainties about the likelihood
of litigation. Even if the speaker is confident that the tort rules
will not result in liability, there remains the risk that a
prospective plaintiff who does not share that assessment may
put the speaker to the costs - financial and other - of finding
out. This risk is difficult to estimate because it depends on
many imponderables, such as the law's uncertainty, the factual
complexity of the potential case, the availability of procedures
for early resolution, the litigiousness of potential plaintiffs, and
their tenacity and resources.
Fine-tuning doctrine or procedures can never entirely
remove the burden that tort law imposes on speech.
Attempting to do so is likely to lead to an endless incremental
progression toward abolition, as has happened in defamation.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan9" the Court identified "a
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
91 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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open . . . . " But the law of defamation even as modified by the
New York Times rule continued to inhibit debate, so the Court
adopted, one by one, numerous other constitutional limitations
on defamation law. 3 Finally, after twenty-five years and
twenty-seven Supreme Court decisions, defamation law was
effectively disabled, at least in the sphere of public affairs, and
debate about those matters ceased to be significantly inhibited
by the law of defamation."
If this is to be the eventual outcome of attempts to
accommodate tort law with the First Amendment, there is
much to be said for reaching that result sooner rather than
later. A generation of plaintiffs could be spared the illusion
that tort law gives them a remedy, a generation of defendants
could be spared the expense and uncertainty of litigating each
step in the dismantling of the tort law, and the public could
have the benefits of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open
debate" a generation sooner.
Even if tort liability is not to be rejected ex ante in all
cases where the harm results from the content of speech,
certain specific torts or tort theories might well be
preemptively dispatched. For example, ordinary negligence law
probably can never be sufficiently protective, at least when
applied to truthful speech. A number of courts have concluded
that the false light branch of privacy law is unjustifiable for
various reasons. 5 A few have reached similar conclusions
regarding public disclosure of private facts.'
But preempting specific tort theories does not eliminate
the burden on speech entirely, because as long as other tort
theories remain available, plaintiffs will try to shift their
claims into those other categories. In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, the Supreme Court seemed to fear that public figures
92 Id. at 270.
93 These included extending the actual malice rule to public figures, criminal
libel, and disparagement cases; imposing limits on recovery by private plaintiffs;
narrowing the definition of actual malice; restricting recovery for rhetorical excesses,
nonfactual statements, substantially true reports of confusing government reports, and
misquotation; reversing the burden of proof as to truth; and requiring independent
review of libel judgments. For more history and details of these additions, see David A.
Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 487 (1991).
See id. at 488 n.2 (citing these decisions chronologically).
95 See Renwick v. News and Observer Pub. Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 411 (N.C.
1984); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998).
96 See Anderson v. Fisher Broad. Cos., 712 P.2d 803, 814 (Or. 1986); Hall v.
Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988).
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barred from recovering for defamation would attempt to
recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress.97 A rash
of claims for intrusion and related torts in the 1980s and 1990s
was widely thought to be the result of the increasing difficulty
of recovering for defamation.' Lawyers who recognize that
their clients' claims for physical harms will not succeed as
simple negligence claims have been ingenious in proposing
modified negligence theories that offer slightly more speech-
protective alternatives.9'
The only way to be sure tort liability does not deter
speech is to abolish it in all cases in which the harm results
from speech. That of course need not and will not happen,
because not all speech is constitutionally protected. No one
thinks it necessary to avoid deterring intentional
misrepresentation or solicitation of crime." But much tort
liability arises from speech that is otherwise fully protected -
truthful speech about matters of public concern - and that too
will always be deterred to some extent unless tort liability is
abolished in all cases arising from that category of speech. But
doing that would sacrifice other important values, such as
privacy and emotional and physical security. Whether we are
willing to forfeit those values in the interest of free speech is
the heart of the matter. One might argue that those interests
would be better served by other legal remedies, such as
injunctions or criminal prosecutions, but those would face
constitutional objections too.1'9 Whatever its defects, tort law is
97 See 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
98 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive
Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 202 (1998)(identifying a "disturbing trend" by plaintiffs lawyers to circumvent First Amendment
limitations on defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress by suing on other tort theories such as trespass and fraud); David A. Logan,
Masked Media: Judges, Juries, and the Law of Surreptitious Newsgathering, 83 IOWA
L. REV. 161, 162-63 (1997) ("Subjects of unflattering stories now increasingly turn to
what cheerleaders for the media derisively term 'trash torts,' primary among them
fraud and trespass.") (footnote omitted).
See, e.g., Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th
Cir. 1992) (allowing recovery for wrongful death on modified negligence theory); Clift v.Narragansett Television L.P., 688 A.2d 805 (R.I. 1996) (permitting wrongful death
claim for suicide to proceed on uncontrollable impulse theory).
too Why that is so has generated much interesting discussion. See generallyGREENAWALT, supra note 57; STANLEY EUGENE FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE
SPEECH, AND ITS A GOOD THING, TOO (1994).
101 See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (holding that First
Amendment prohibits enjoining defamatory newspaper as public nuisance); Gilbert v.
National Enquirer, Inc., 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 91 (1996) (denying request to enjoin invasion
of privacy).
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the only existing legal protection for these interests. We cannot
assume that if it is abolished, some other remedy will be
provided in its place. For the present, at least, the question is
whether tort law protects sufficiently important interests that
it should be preserved despite some ineradicable level of
burden on protected speech. The answer to that question is far
from self-evident.
B. Are The Burdens Justifiable?
The least controversial justification for retaining some
liability is the goal of compensating injured parties. As Fred
Schauer has demonstrated,'2 one effect of denying tort liability
for harms caused by speech is to relieve the public of the need
to pay for the benefits of free speech. When, in the interest of
free speech, compensation is denied to those whose reputations
are damaged, whose privacy is invaded, or whose physical or
emotional security is invaded, it is the victims who bear the
cost of free speech.'" The First Amendment argument is not
that the usual goal of imposing the costs on those who benefit
is inapplicable to these cases, or that it is somehow fair that
these injured individuals bear the cost of free speech,' or that
it would be unjust to transfer the costs to the tortfeasors.
Rather, it is that doing so would deprive the public of the
benefits of free speech.'
102 Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321
(1992).
103 Id. at 1326-27.
104 The Court's occasional attempts to argue that it is fair to place the burden
of free speech on the injured individuals are unconvincing.
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court asserted that
"the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials
and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from
defamatory falsehood concerning them." Id. at 345. But that argument is circular. They
have "voluntarily" assumed that risk only in the sense that the law imposes it on them.
One could as well argue that it is fair to draw and quarter them as long as they know
the law allows it.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court argued that the
constitutional privilege to defame public officials is a "fair equivalent" of the privilege
that allows public officials to defame others. 376 U.S. 254, 282-83 (1964). But there is
no correlation between the level of privilege that a defamed public official must
overcome and the privilege available to her when she defames someone. As a plaintiff,
the public figure must overcome the uniformly high barrier established by the actual
malice standard, while the privilege available to public officials as defendants varies
widely, ranging from absolute privilege for judges and those at the very highest levels
of the executive branch to merely the common law qualified privilege for most public
officials.
.0 Schauer, supra note 102, at 1334.
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This is by no means the only instance in which the law
requires the individual to bear costs for the greater good,"a but
it is something of an anomaly in a system that generally insists
that individuals be compensated when their assets are
appropriated for public benefit.' 7 No one claims that permitting
confiscation of reputation, privacy, or security in the interest of
free speech is an inherently good thing. 8 The most that can be
said for it is that it is a necessary, or at least expedient, evil.
Socializing losses by requiring those who benefit to compensate
those who bear the burdens is clearly the better solution unless
it cannot be efficiently accomplished. That it cannot is entirely
possible; as tort reformers are successfully arguing in many
other areas, the costs of transferring burdens of speech torts
from the victims to the tortfeasors may be greater than the
benefits. But as Professor Schauer says, "that the cost of a
constitutional right is being borne disproportionately by
victims of its exercise ought at least to occasion more thought,
especially in the First Amendment area, than it has to date."'"
More controversial, but possibly important also, are
justifications that have to do with goals other than
compensation. The importance of these considerations, as well
as their independence from the compensation justification, can
be seen by taking Professor Schauer's uncoupling of free speech
a step further. Imagine a world in which all those injured by
speech were compensated by an infinitely munificent private
benefactor, so none of the rest of us would have to pay for the
benefits of free speech; would we then want to free those whose
speech inflicts the injuries from any form of legal
accountability?1. If we would not - if we would fear that
10 Professor Schauer mentions zoning regulations and trade embargoes as
examples of other legal choices that impose costs on individuals for the greater good.
Id. at 1348, 1356. Many conspicuous current examples can be found in those aspects of
the tort reform movement that deny compensation in the interest of reducing insurance
premiums or curtailing litigation.
107 See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment prohibits government "from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole").
'08 Some do suggest that permitting this confiscation might not be as bad as
leaving non-speech-related injuries uncompensated, either because speech is less
immediately dangerous than conduct, see MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF
ExPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 18-19 (1984), or because the consequences of speech
are more speculative than those of action, see RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 201-03 (1977). But arguing something is less bad is a long way from
arguing that it is inherently good.
109 Schauer, supra note 102, at 1357.
110 Cf. id. at 1356 (recognizing the possibility of noncompensatory objectives).
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unrestrained freedom of speech might produce distortion of
public discourse, threats to civility and tolerance, abuse of
power, or loss of credibility and reliability, for example - then it
would be clear that compensation is not the only goal of
liability in the speech torts."' The debate as to whether speech
should be immunized from tort liability should include the
possibility that potential liability serves a useful role as an
instrument of social control."2 I suspect the reluctance to openly
consider legal accountability as an independent goal has more
to do with distrust of the legal institutions that might exercise
that power than it has to do with the desirability of the goal
itself; it would be hard to argue against some form of legal
accountability if we were confident it could be administered
neutrally.
Whether tort law restricts speech too much depends on
one's assessment of the severity of the burdens and the
strength of the countervailing interests. It is clear, however,
that no amount of tinkering will eliminate the burdens
entirely.
V. RESOLVING TORT-SPEECH CONFLICTS
The argument that tort law must be limited by the First
Amendment rests on a peculiar premise: that courts applying
tort law cannot be trusted to respect free speech values, but
that courts applying constitutional law can. The argument is
especially curious, because in all except those few cases that
reach the Supreme Court, the same courts are making the
decisions. But the argument is far from specious. For one thing,
even if one believes that tort law generally can be trusted to
protect speech, there is something to be said for having two
lines of protection, one grounded in tort law and the other in
the powerful rhetorical and historical traditions of the First
I have stated my own conclusion on these matters elsewhere:
Some form of libel law is as essential to the health of the commonweal and
the press as it is to the victims of defamation. Without libel law, credibility of
the press would be at the mercy of the least scrupulous among it, and public
discourse would have no necessary anchor in truth.
Anderson, supra note 93, at 490.
112 See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation
and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691 (1986); Robert C. Post, The Social
Foundations of Privacy Law: Community and the Self in the Common Law Tort, 77
CALIF. L. REV. 957 (1989). In both articles, Professor Post argues eloquently that these
torts serve purposes that have at least as much to do with creating and preserving
social norms as with compensating individuals for injury.
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Amendment. 3 "Your Honor, this is a First Amendment case"
may capture a judge's attention in a way that "This is a tort
case with free speech implications" does not.
Second, constitutional law provides a check on juries
that would not be available if tort judgments were not
considered state action. Courts reviewing judgments as a
matter of tort law normally do not review the correctness of
results, especially jury verdicts; they review the trial judge's
decisions on questions of law' and unless they find error in
those they rarely question the result."5 First Amendment law
permits - and sometimes requires - the reviewing court to step
outside that procedurally constrained role and evaluate the
effect that the result can be expected to have on speech, quite
apart from the correctness of the trial judge's specific rulings."6
Of course this expansive species of judicial review did not exist
in First Amendment law until the Supreme Court created it,
and there is no intrinsic reason why judicial review in tort law
could not be expanded to include a similarly wide-ranging
appraisal of effects." But the possibility of such a major
departure from the fundamental culture of tort law is a
questionable substitute for the already-established practice of
aggressive judicial review in First Amendment law.
1 For a perceptive essay on the importance of the rhetorical tradition in First
Amendment law, see Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic
Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653
(1988).
.. DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1 (2d ed.
1998).
", One of the few instances in which courts have some power to reject the
jury's result simply because they disagree with it is in connection with awards of
punitive damages. See, e.g., Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218, 222-23 (Ala.
1989) (holding that trial judge properly reduced damage award despite presumption of
correctness of jury verdict); Trans. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 31 (Tex. 1994)
(requiring intermediate appellate courts to scrutinize punitive damage awards).
116 In Sullivan, the Court asserted that if the judgment against The New York
Times (and the damages sought in four other lawsuits based on the same publication)
were permitted, "[wihether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of such
judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to
public criticism is an atmosphere in which the First Amendment freedoms cannot
survive." 376 U.S. at 278.
17 As they have been expanded, for example, in response to Supreme Court
decisions holding that due process requires intensified judicial review of punitive
damages. See, e.g., Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Johnson, 701 So. 2d 524 (Ala. 1997)
(describing extensive review required by combination of state law and federal
constitutional requirements). State constitutional provisions guaranteeing a jury trial
might impose some outside limits on state courts' power to expand judicial review. Cf.
Sorrell v. Quality Stores, Inc., 633 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio 1994) (holding unconstitutional
statute requiring courts to deduct collateral payments).
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A. How the Court Decides Speech-Tort Cases
The courts have universally assumed that tort liability
is neither exempted from nor foreclosed by the First
Amendment. As long as that is so, courts must decide how to
decide what the First Amendment permits. This question is an
intricate one for several reasons, one of which involves an
under-appreciated fact about the Supreme Court's power: the
Court lacks - or at least does not exercise - common-law power
to change tort law. Because of this, the how-to-decide question
touches on the limits of the Court's Article III power, practical
and prudential limits on judicial power, and the dynamics of
interaction between tort law and constitutional law.
The significance of the Court's inability to modify tort
law can be appreciated by looking at a system that does not
have that limitation, such as Australia. The Australian
constitution protects freedom of political communication."8 The
High Court initially gave effect to that freedom in the field of
defamation by creating a constitutional rule..9 similar to that of
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.'2 ° The High Court soon
reconsidered, however, and chose instead to protect the
freedom of political expression by expanding the common law of
qualified privilege. 2' That option was available because the
High Court has power to determine the common law. 2 Because
the High Court's decisions on common law matters are binding
on the Australian state courts, its decision to protect political
speech with an expanded common law privilege was almost as
effective' as a constitutional rule would have been.'24 The High
"8 See Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177
CLR 106.
.. See Theophanous v. Herald & Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 182 CLR 104.
120 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
121 See Lange v. Australian Broad. Corp. (1997) 189 CLR 520. The article that
first brought home to me the importance of this alternative was Adrienne Stone,
Freedom of Political Communication, The Constitution and the Common Law, 26 FED.
L. REV. 219 (1998).
122 See Patrick Keyzer, Pfeiffer, Lange, The Common Law of the Constitution
and the Constitutional Right to Natural Justice, 20 AUSTRALIAN BAR REVIEW 87 (2000).
123 High Court interpretations of the common law can be superseded by state
statutes. See Western Australia v. Commonwealth (Native Title Act Case) (1995) 183
CLR 373. The Lange decision acknowledged that if state legislation adopted a less
speech-protective privilege than the one recognized as a matter of common law in
Lange, the court would then have to decide whether the Lange rule was
constitutionally mandated. See Lange, 189 CLR at 575.
121 See Adrienne Stone, Rights, Personal Rights and Freedoms: The Nature of
the Freedom of Political Communication, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 374, 412 (2001).
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Court left the exact contours of the expanded privilege to be
worked out by the states, retaining, of course, the power to
reject, accept, or modify their work.' Moreover, the High Court
retained the power to reinstate a constitutional rule should the
common law approach prove "intractably inconsistent" with the
constitutional norm. 126
The Supreme Court does not enjoy that flexibility.
Whatever it does, it does as a matter of constitutional law.
Possibly this need not be so. The Court may have the power to
create federal common law to protect freedom of speech.
Professor Field has argued that the Court has power to create a
federal common law rule whenever it interprets any federal
constitutional provision or statute as authorizing it to do so.'27 If
such an implicit authorization is to be found in any
constitutional provision, the First Amendment would seem to
be a good candidate. Professor Monaghan has argued for
"[riecognition of a congressionally reversible, constitutionally
based common law implementing the guarantees of individual
liberty,"12 of which the First Amendment surely would be a
prime example. The Court does occasionally create federal
common law, sometimes when the justification for doing so
seems far less compelling than that of protecting speech.'29 And
it has asserted that it has authority to do so when "the
interstate or international nature of the controversy makes it
inappropriate for state law to control,"3 ' a rationale that would
seem highly applicable to at least some speech-tort conflicts.'
125 See Lange, 189 CLR at 575.
126 See id. at 566.
127 Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of the Federal Common Law,
99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 887-88 (1986).
128 Monaghan, supra note 4, at 44 (1975).
12 Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 518 (1988). See Monaghan,
supra note 4, at 18 (arguing that reasons for creating uniform federal common law to
protect civil liberties are "at least as weighty as considerations of governmental
convenience which have justified a uniform federal law in other contexts").
130 Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
131 This rationale, for example, might be applicable to questions aboutjurisdiction and choice of law in Internet defamation cases. See, e.g., Young v. New
Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir.
2002). The most famous Internet defamation case to date, Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick
(2000) 210 CLR 574, involved the assertion of jurisdiction by an Australian court.
Preemption of state law by a federal common law rule could not address that
international issue, but it could address the matter of assertion by U.S. states of
jurisdiction over foreign defendants, and a consistent rule within the U.S. might at last
be a start toward an international resolution.
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But the Court has never created federal common law to
protect speech, at least not explicitly.32 Almost two hundred
years ago the Court renounced the kind of general common law
power that the Australian High Court exercises." The
determination to leave common law questions to the state
courts is so strong that the Court will not review such
questions even when they are raised in cases in which the
Court has undoubted jurisdiction by virtue of other issues that
are properly federal.'3 The Court's declaration in Erie that
"there is no federal general common law"135 has thus far been
assumed to apply to the law of defamation and other speech
torts. The Court has no general supervisory power over state
courts, as it has over federal courts. 13' Thus, when a tort
judgment threatens free speech values, the only way to invoke
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction is to claim a First
Amendment violation, and the only response available to the
Court is a constitutional one. Its solutions to speech-tort
conflicts become rules of constitutional law, not tort law. The
decisions may require state courts to modify,137 or even
abandon, '38 parts of their tort law, but Supreme Court decisions
are not themselves tort law.
Constitutional responses to unconstitutional tort
judgments can take several forms. These can be located
metaphorically along the spectrum of judicial mimimalism to
judicial maximilism suggested by Professor Sunstein1 31 In the
tort context, the minimal response is a simple declaration of
unconstitutionality. The Court did something close to this,
though not very forthrightly, in one tort case, NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware4 ° The opinion in that case amounts to
132 Professor Monaghan argued some of the Court's constitutional
interpretations would be better understood as subconstitutional principles of common
law even though the Court did not recognize them as such. Monaghan, supra note 4, at
2-3.
13 U.S. v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32-33 (1812).
134 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874).
135 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
136 See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982).
137 See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777-78 (1986)
(requiring states to reverse the burden of proof as to truth or falsity in libel cases about
matters of public concern).
138 See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (forbidding
states from imposing liability for disclosure of private facts that come from public
judicial records).
139 Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6, 15
(1996).
140 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
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little more than a declaration that the judgment in question is
unconstitutional, without further attempt to say how the tort of
interference with patronage would have to be modified to make
it constitutional. This is what the Court normally does when it
holds a statute unconstitutional. It does not rewrite the statute
to make it constitutional.1 4 ' The Court's identification of the
constitutional infirmity may make the solution obvious, but the
Court still leaves it to the legislature to make the correction.212
The legislature is presumed to be better equipped than the
Court to decide whether the constitutional objection makes it
impossible (or impractical) to achieve the legislature's
objectives, whether the limitation alters the balance of costs
and benefits enough to require broader modifications of the
statutory scheme, or whether some entirely different approach
to the problem (e.g., a carrot rather than a stick) may be
preferable in light of the constitutional problem. 143
In some situations the Court might want to make clear
that the problem lies not merely with the result reached in the
particular case, but is endemic in some aspect of the state's tort
scheme. In such a case, the Court would not merely hold the
judgment unconstitutional, but would identify the aspects of
the liability scheme that make it unconstitutional, as the Court
did in Florida Star.'" This response is located a bit farther
along the continuum, but it still consists only of identifying the
constitutional problem, not prescribing the solution. The Court
does something analogous to this when it holds a statute
unconstitutional on its face, making clear that the problem is
1 The Court can, and sometimes does, construe a federal statute narrowly to
save it from unconstitutionality. See, e.g., United States v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S.
366 (1909). Even as to federal statutes, the space for saving constructions is severely
limited in First Amendment cases by the principle that the statute as narrowed must
not be vague. See Aptheker v. Sec'y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515-17 (1964). This power is
limited as to state statutes, however, by the principle that the state court's
interpretation of the statute is conclusive. See Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 455
(1905).
... State courts may also have a role in correcting the infirmity. Because they,
unlike the Court, have the power to authoritatively construe state statutes, the Court
may invite them to make saving constructions that the Court itself could not make.
See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967) (holding that a state statute would
be unconstitutional unless given the narrowing construction specified by the Court, but
leaving it for the state courts to decide whether to adopt that construction).
' See, e.g., Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 58-60 (1968) (refusing to
engage in a saving construction of a statute because it could not be sure Congress
would think the statute worthwhile with the proposed modification).
144 Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
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larger than the result in the particular case. "5 In the statutory
context, however, the Court recognizes that this is strong
medicine, not to be prescribed as the routine remedy, even for
abridgements of speech. "" In the tort context, broad-spectrum
remedies are the norm.
Farther along the spectrum is the response that not
only holds the judgment (and possibly also specified portions of
the state's tort law) unconstitutional, but also provides a test,
or more accurately a method of analysis, that the Court has
used to decide the constitutional question and presumably will
use in deciding such questions in the future. Florida Star"7 is
again an example of this approach. The Court identified the
problematic aspects of the law on which the judgment was
based, but it also announced a test: "[W]here a newspaper
publishes truthful information which it has lawfully obtained,
punishment may be lawfully imposed, if at all, only when
narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order .... ,148
The holding was simply "that no such interest is satisfactorily
served by imposing liability ... under the facts of this case."4 9
Future litigants are free to propose their own solutions, but
with the knowledge that they will not be acceptable unless they
are "narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order."
This is the only Supreme Court decision so far that adopts a
test for tort liability rather than a prescription."'
It is possible, of course, to describe a prescription as a
test. One could say, for example, that actual malice is "the test"
by which the Court will decide whether a libel judgment is
permissible. But when a "test" permits only one doctrinal
response, it is what I call a prescription, and it is the kind of
145 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105 (1991) (holding statute unconstitutional because of its impact on a wide range of
speech).
141 See, e.g., Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003) (holding that state court
should not have administered "strong medicine" of facial invalidity even though statute
might be invalid as applied).
147 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
141 Id. at 541.
149 Id.
"0 If the decision in Florida Star is wrong, it is not because the approach is
wrong. One might argue that the Court chose an inappropriate test, or applied it
inappropriately to the case at hand. In fact, I think it did both; as indicated above, I
think it is unrealistic to demand that tort remedies be "narrowly tailored," but even
under that standard, I think the rather precise remedy Florida provided B.J.F. should
have been accepted as sufficiently "narrowly tailored." But whatever one's position on
those questions, Florida Star cannot be faulted for choosing to address the problem
with a test rather than prescribe a solution.
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response with which this Article is concerned. There is a
difference between constitutional prescriptions and "tests" of
constitutionality, although the distinction is not always easy to
maintain. Prescriptions say, "These are the rules you must
follow if your remedy is to be constitutionally permissible."
Tests say, "These are the criteria by which your remedy will be
judged; you choose the remedy and we will tell you whether it
meets the test."
In tort cases, the Court usually does not choose any of
these less ambitious responses; the standard response is at the
maximilist end of the spectrum. When the Court holds a tort
judgment in violation of the First Amendment, it usually
prescribes the solution. Prescribed solutions can be simple or
elaborate. An example of the former is the rule that states may
not impose liability for disclosing privacy-invading information
obtained from judicial records that are open to public
inspection.15' An example of the latter is the phalanx of
constitutional rules limiting defamation. To recover for libel or
slander, a public official must prove that the defendant acted
with actual malice.5 Elected officials,' candidates for public
office," and appointed officials who have or appear to the
public to have substantial responsibility for or control over
governmental affairs1" must be treated as public officials. The
same rules apply to public figures,1" and anyone who is
involved in the resolution of important public questions, or who
by reason of his or her fame shapes events in areas of concern
to society, is treated as a public figure.'57 To prove actual
malice, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew the
defamatory statement was false, or had serious doubts about
its truth." That must be shown by clear and convincing proof,'
and each reviewing court must subject a finding of actual
malice to independent review instead of the normal clearly
'5' Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
152 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
"3 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
1 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v.
Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).
155 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
6 Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
17 Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (decided together with
Curtis), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 28 (1967) (granting certiorari, reversing, and remanding
for proceedings not inconsistent with Curtis, 388 U.S. 130).
r8 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
1 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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erroneous standard." Private persons who are not public
figures but who are defamed in connection with matters of
public concern must meet all the preceding requirements in
order to recover presumed or punitive damages but may
recover for actual injury by showing that the defendant was
negligent."' All of the preceding types of plaintiffs must bear
the burden of proving that the defamatory statement is false. '
States may not permit recovery for rhetorical hyperbole,"
statements that cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating
actual facts about the plaintiff," or deliberate misquotation
that does not materially alter the meaning," and those
determinations are to be made as a matter of law rather than
left to juries." All of these are constitutional rules that displace
common law rules that are wholly or partially inconsistent.
A less elaborate set of prescribed constitutional rules
limits the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress:
Public officials and figures who sue for emotional distress
intentionally inflicted by satire must show' 7 a false statement
of fact made with knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity."
The claim that the Court usually prescribes its own
solutions to speech-tort conflicts is only slightly hyperbolic. One
might assume that these solutions are products of the normal
litigation process and therefore are "prescribed" by the Court
160 Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
Defendants are entitled to independent review when actual malice is found, but not
when there is a finding of no actual malice. See Brown v. K.N.D. Corp., 529 A.2d 1292,
1294-95 (Conn. 1997) (holding that the "clearly erroneous" standard applies to a
finding of actual malice).
161 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
162 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
'6 Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass'n v. Bressler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970); see also Linn
v. United Plant Guard Workers of Am., Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 62-63 (1966).
16 See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17 (1990); Letter Carriers
v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284-86 (1974).
" Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
166 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (stating that these
are questions of law to be independently reviewed by appellate state courts).
167 The assertion that plaintiffs "must show" something under these
constitutional rules is not quite accurate. The Court rarely orders anyone to do
anything, and it does not literally tell the states what to do in tort cases. Its edicts are
conditional: "If you want to award damages to public officials for harm to reputation,
you must require them to prove actual malice." The same thing sometimes happens
with statutes, though less frequently: the Court may say, in effect, "If you want to
accomplish the aims of this statute, you must do x or y." See, e.g., Garrison v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964) (holding that a state cannot apply its criminal libel
statute to defamation of a public official without proving knowledge or reckless
disregard of falsity).
'68 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
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only in the sense that the Court accepts them after they have
been proposed by litigants and accepted or rejected by state
courts. That is not always the case. Some of the solutions the
Court has prescribed so far were neither proposed by the
litigants nor considered by the state courts. They were devised
by the Court itself without benefit of advocacy or consideration
by state courts. For example, the Court adopted the rule that
allows private persons to recover for actual injury by proving
negligence rather than actual malice even though neither of
the parties proposed it and the lower courts did not consider
it. 60 The rule that actual malice must be shown by clear and
convincing proof also was invented by the Court without
having been proposed by the parties or considered by the courts
below.'0 The actual malice test itself is in substance the Court's
invention; The New York Times did propose a test bearing that
name but it bears little resemblance to the test the Court
prescribed.'7 '
169 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343-52 (1974). The issues
addressed by the parties and the courts below involved the applicability of the actual
malice test; no less onerous alternatives were proposed. In the Supreme Court, the
plaintiff argued, under the rather confusing heading 'Petitioner's Right of Privacy Has
Been Wrongfully Destroyed by Respondent," that defamers of non-public figures should
have to meet a probable-cause standard analogous to that required of the government
in Fourth Amendment cases. See Brief for Petitioner at 34-35, Gertz (No. 72-617). The
defendant responded to this with a one-paragraph assertion that editors would have to
obtain a prior judicial determination of probable cause, which would amount to
censorship. See Brief for Respondent at 19, Gertz (No. 72-617). That is as close as the
parties came to advocating any element of the solution adopted by the Court.
17 The Court introduced this requirement offhandedly in Sullivan by saying
the proof presented in that case "lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional
standard demands." N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
Subsequent cases make clear, however, that this standard supplants the usual
preponderance of evidence standard in cases in which actual malice must be shown.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1986) (holding that the
convincing clarity standard must be applied even at the summary judgment stage
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
171 The New York Times' principal argument was that public officials should
be absolutely barred from recovering for defamation arising from criticism of their
official conduct. As an alternative, it proposed that the Court follow the lead of a
number of commentators and lower courts that had advocated expanding the common
law fair comment privilege to include false statements of fact about public officials if
not made with actual malice. See Brief for Petitioner at 53-54, Sullivan (No. 39). Those
authorities referred to the common law concept of actual malice, however, and that
allowed actual malice to be shown by lack of good faith or lack of due care rather than
the far more rigorous knowing-or-reckless-falsity standard that the Court adopted.
The proof is made from an interpretation of the writing, its malignity, or
intemperance by showing recklessness in making the charge, pernicious
activity in circulating or repeating it, its falsity, the situation and relations of
the parties, the facts and circumstances surrounding the publication, and by
other evidence appropriate to a charge of bad motives as in other cases.
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Tort cases are not the only ones in which the Court
prescribes solutions to constitutional problems. When what is
challenged is not a statute but a practice or procedure, the
Court sometimes specifies how it must be changed to make it
constitutional. The best known examples are in criminal law,
where the Court has prescribed such measures as the Miranda
warning'72 and the exclusionary rule'73 to guard against
violations of defendants' Fifth and Fourth Amendment rights.
Elsewhere in First Amendment law, the Court has prescribed
procedures that must be followed in movie censorship'74 and in
closing courtrooms.7 ' And in school desegregation cases, the
Court famously specified steps that schools had to take toward
integration.74 These are exceptional interventions, however; in
speech torts, prescribed solutions are the norm.
It is not clear why the Court feels obliged, or even
authorized, to prescribe solutions in tort cases. It could simply
declare the tort judgment unconstitutional, leaving it to the
state courts to decide how to modify their common law to
eliminate the First Amendment objection.
One reason the practice has not generated much protest
may have to do with the setting in which it originated. The
Court first embarked on this course in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan."7 That case came from Alabama in the early 1960s,
and the political and judicial climate in that time and place
Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 292 (Kan. 1908). See also Dix W. Noel, Defamation
of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 875, 893 (1949) (arguing "only
that the defendant should be protected where it appears that he acted in good faith and
with due care"). The New York Times argued, rather disingenuously:
This approach draws a line between expression uttered with the purpose of
harming the official by an accusation known to be unfounded, and expression
which is merely wrong in fact, with denigrating implications. It thus makes
an essential element of liability an intent similar to that which elsewhere has
been deemed necessary to sustain a curb on utterance ....
Brief for Petitioner at 53-54, Sullivan (No. 39) (citing Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951)). Actual malice as used in the authorities cited by The New York Times was
a concept far short of intent.
112 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). If there was ever any
doubt as to whether the Miranda warning was constitutionally prescribed, it was
removed by Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
173 See Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
174 See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 60-61 (1965) (requiring expedited
procedures to determine whether movies can be banned on the ground of obscenity).
175 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal. for Riverside County, 464
U.S. 501, 510 (1984) (requiring trial judges to make "findings specific enough that a
reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered").
176 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1971).
177 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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made it hard to argue that the Supreme Court should have
merely declared the judgment unconstitutional and allowed the
state courts to decide what to do about it.'78
A second reason for the lack of protest may be that
prescribing rules for tort cases does not seem as hostile to
comity principles as rewriting a statute. The Court is not
repudiating a legislative decision;7 9 it is merely replacing one
judge-made rule with another. Indeed, the Court has
sometimes gone out of its way to suggest that it is only doing
what common law courts have always done, or something very
similar."u But having renounced common law power, doing
what common law courts do should be a source of uneasiness,
not a source of comfort. The Court is making rules of
substantive law, and if it is a bad idea to do that as a matter of
common law, we might expect some explanation as to why it is
a good idea when done in the name of constitutional law. Of
course it is the Court's unquestioned duty to say what the
constitution forbids, and sometimes what it requires. But if
there are important reasons why the Court should not impose
its solutions on tort problems through the common law, one
would not expect those reasons to simply disappear when the
Court imposes the solutions as a matter of constitutional law.
The obvious answer is that when there are
constitutional rights to be protected, the Court has powers that
it otherwise does not. Indeed, when the constitutional right in
question is freedom of speech, the Court's power may be
especially expansive.' Many believe the Supreme Court has a
8 See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 89
(1991) (asserting that if the Court had not intervened aggressively in Sullivan, "there
was the real risk that an Alabama jury would find whatever facts were necessary to
justify the imposition of liability").
179 One exception is Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986), in
which the Court held unconstitutional a statute assigning defendants the burden of
proving truth in defamation cases. The statute merely codified the universal common
law rule, however, so the Court's decision was less a repudiation of legislature than of
the common law. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967), the Court held
unconstitutional a judgment based on the New York privacy statute, but the Court
declined to hold the statute unconstitutional in the expectation that "the New York
courts will apply the statute consistently with the constitutional command." Fla. Star,
Inc. v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989), was a negligence per se action based on violation of
a criminal statute, but the constitutionality of the statute itself was not at issue. The
statute was later held unconstitutional by the state courts, however. State v. Globe
Communications Corp., 648 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1994).
"0 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
's' See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 105-179 (1980) (arguing that the Constitution's central commitment
is to political democracy and the Court therefore must be especially vigilant to protect
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special responsibility to protect speech, one that requires more
than a passive or reactive role.'82 Some argue that the
importance of free speech requires the Court to not merely
decide cases, but to use the opportunities that cases provide to
articulate clear and expansive principles."u My colleague
Lawrence Sager suggests that the Court may be thought of as a
sort of quality control inspector, in charge of maintaining a
vigorous system of free speech. If the Court merely held tort
judgments unconstitutional, leaving courts free to react to
those decisions as they see fit, speech might be freed from
unconstitutional burdens too slowly, or perhaps never.
Recalcitrant courts could respond to the Court's decision by
modifying their tort law enough to present a different
constitutional question but not enough to meet all the
constitutional objections, and only a long series of Supreme
Court decisions would finally remove the burden.
But these arguments do not explain the difference in
treatment between statutes and tort judgments. The Supreme
Court's special responsibility for speech applies no less to
statutes than to tort law. Legislatures too could react
grudgingly to Supreme Court decisions, replacing
unconstitutional statutes with others slightly different but also
unconstitutional." Yet the Court does not treat that possibility
as a justification for telling the legislature what it must do, at
least not until the legislature demonstrates its mala fides.
Moreover, if foot-dragging were a problem, prescribing detailed
constitutional rules would not necessarily solve it. Courts
determined to resist the Supreme Court's constitutional
the types of speech on which democracy depends). The origins of this proposition are
usually traced to United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(suggesting that the Court's review may be more searching when applied to legislation
that "restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation").
182 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing
Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1027 (arguing that in First
Amendment cases, 'A Supreme Court opinion should strive for more than a 'fair
balancing' in the individual case before the Court. . . . [T]he risks of case-by-case
adjudication may be too great and broader prophylactic rules may be appropriate.").
183 See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on 'The
Central Meaning of the First Amendment', 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191 (praising the Court
for seizing the opportunity provided by that case to declare the unconstitutionality of
seditious libel and to identify that as the central meaning of the First Amendment).
'84 For example, when the Court struck down Congress's attempt through the
Communications Decency Act to protect minors from sexual depictions on the Internet,
see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), Congress promptly passed the Child Online
Protection Act, which aimed to accomplish the same thing and was also held
unconstitutional, see ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003).
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prescriptions can always apply those grudgingly too, delaying
their implementation by forcing the Supreme Court to deal
repeatedly with slight variations in application.
Despite having forsworn the power to make rules of tort
law, the Court typically resolves speech-tort conflicts by
prescribing tort-like constitutional rules that displace tort law.
I turn now to the pros and cons of that approach.
B. The Merits of Detailed Prescriptions
1. Advantages
There are several reasons for preferring Supreme Court
solutions to those the state courts would reach. One has to do
with the role of juries. As mentioned above, the Court's
decisions in tort cases have significantly reduced the jury's
power.185 The Court asserted in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
that the Seventh Amendment does not preclude it from
reviewing factual determinations to make sure constitutional
rules have been properly applied.8 ' State courts engaged in
revising state tort law do not have the benefit of that trump
card. Their solutions have to satisfy state constitutions, almost
all of which guarantee a right to jury trial in civil cases.'87 If the
route to protecting speech from tort lies in restricting juries,
the Supreme Court is better positioned to do that than the
state courts.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 151-68. See also Susan M. Gilles,
Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of Process in Libel
Litigation, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1806-08 (1998).
1 376 U.S. 254, 285 n.26 (1964). The Seventh Amendment might not be
much of an obstacle anyway, because it does not apply to state courts, Eilenbecker v.
Plymouth County District Court, 134 U.S. 31 (1890), Olesen v. Trust Co. of Chicago,
245 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1957), and because it is a weak guarantee even in federal courts,
see Atlas Roofing Co., Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442 (1977) (denying right of jury trial in federal proceeding).
187 See 1 GEORGE D. BRADEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
TEXAS: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 57 (1977) (stating that all state
constitutions guarantee a right of jury trial in criminal cases and that "[allmost
without exception they guarantee the jury in civil cases as well"). The strength of these
state guarantees varies widely. Compare Smith v. Printup, 866 P.2d 985 (Kan. 1993)
(permitting legislature to take away jury's power to determine amount of punitive
damages despite constitutional provision that right to jury trial shall remain inviolate),
with Lakin v. Senco. Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999) (holding legislature's limit on
noneconomic damages in violation of state constitutional right of jury trial). For a good
example of the intricacies of complying with state jury trial guarantees, see William
Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another Look at "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence",
69 TEXAS L. REv. 515 (1991).
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Another reason for preferring the Court's solutions to
those that the state courts would reach may be a belief that
state courts will be less sensitive to speech interests. There was
a period when that was surely true - when the Supreme Court
was more dependably protective of speech than the state
courts. It was in that period when the Court's practice of
prescribing detailed solutions to tort conflicts developed. But it
is not at all clear that the Court has been more protective
historically or that it will continue to be so. The Court did not
become a force in the protection of speech in any context until
well into the twentieth century," and did not become a force in
the tort context until 1964.1" Now state courts are sometimes
more protective of speech than the Supreme Court." Of course,
there is and is likely to always be considerable variation in the
states' commitment to free speech, and more specifically, their
willingness to prefer speech interests over tort interests.
That implicates another reason for preferring Court-
prescribed solutions: national uniformity. The Court has used
the First Amendment to achieve a degree of national
uniformity in tort-speech conflicts that would be impossible if
the solution to the constitutional problems were left to the
common law. Indeed, the resulting nationalization of remedies
may be as important as the substantive rules themselves.
Having to evaluate the liability schemes of fifty jurisdictions
imposes a considerable burden on speech in itself, quite apart
from the actual effects of those schemes. This is not an
enormous burden today because the common law rules are
generally similar from state to state, but even now the risk of
speaking cannot be evaluated confidently without investigating
the possibility that a state whose law might be relevant might
188 Most commentators identify the Espionage Act cases of the World War I
era as the dawn of First Amendment jurisprudence in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., G.
Edward White, The First Amendment Comes of Age: The Emergence of Free Speech in
Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 299 (1996). My colleague David Rabban
has shown that those decisions had roots in the civil liberties movement that emerged
in the generation preceding that war. See David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in
Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514 (1981).
189 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), was the first decision
holding a tort judgment unconstitutional.
190 See, e.g., State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 18 (Or. 1987) ("In this state any
person can write, print, read, say, show or sell anything to a consenting adult even
though that expression may be generally or even universally considered 'obscene.");
Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1054 (Colo. 2002) ("With respect
to expressive freedoms, this court has recognized that the Colorado Constitution
provides broader free speech protections than the Federal Constitution.") (citing
numerous cases applying those broader protections).
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employ a variant rule. If a larger share of the task of resolving
speech-tort conflicts were left to the states, we could expect
more state-to-state variation and consequently more difficulty
in evaluating risk. Replacing common law tort rules with
federal constitutional rules, whatever their substance, provides
consistency, uniformity, and predictability, making it easier for
interstate speakers to know what they can safely say. Today
there is little speech that is not capable of crossing state lines,
making this a matter of some importance, not only for the
national media but for the entire system of freedom of
expression.
Nonetheless, it would be a rather large step for the
Court to hold that the First Amendment requires it to
nationalize tort law in order to avoid the burdens on speech
that arise from state-to-state variations.'91 One would expect
the Court to reject that proposition,9 ' at least until it is
persuaded that media and other interstate speakers cannot
solve that problem by the means by which others who covet
national uniformity have overcome the disadvantages of
federalism - namely, uniform acts or federal legislation.'93 If the
Court is unwilling to wait for Congress or the states to enact
those solutions, it could take the initiative itself by replacing
state tort law with federal common law.
Limiting juries, consolidating free speech jurisprudence
in the Supreme Court, and achieving national uniformity have
contributed greatly to the system of freedom of expression we
have today. The Court has never advanced these as
justifications for its intervention in tort law, however, and
whether it can appropriately do so is at least debateable.'95 If
191 Acceptance of this rationale would seem all the more anomalous today in
light of the Court's present disinclination to allow the commerce clause to be used as a
shortcut to national uniformity. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (rejecting
government's argument that national interest in facilitating learning, preventing
insurance losses due to violent crimes in schools, and protecting right to travel brought
federal statute regulating firearms in school zones within commerce power); U.S. v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that congressional findings as to effects of
gender-motivated violence on national productivity were insufficient to bring federal
Violence Against Women Act within commerce power).
192 Cf. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 US. 213, 219-20 (1997) (holding that general
need for uniformity is not sufficient in itself to justify creation of federal common law).
193 "Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace state law is
primarily a decision for Congress." Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S.
63, 68 (1966).
19 See supra text accompanying notes 127-31.
195 Learning that their descendants believe free speech can only be protected
by restricting the jury would certainly come as a surprise to John Peter Zenger and
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some or all of these are the grounds for aggressive intervention
in tort law, the Court should identify and articulate them and
make the argument that these benefits outweigh the
advantages of preserving the usual division of responsibility
between the Court and the states.
2. Disadvantages
The arguments against the Court's practice of
prescribing solutions when it concludes that tort judgments
violate the First Amendment are both theoretical and
prudential. At the theoretical level the practice raises questions
relating to federalism and judicial power. Strictly speaking, the
only question before the Court when a tort judgment allegedly
violates the First Amendment is whether the state has done
something that abridges the freedom of speech. Of course the
Court can do more than answer "yes" or "no." No one doubts
that the Court has the power to explain what the offending
provision is and why it is unconstitutional. But questions arise
when the Court moves beyond that toward a more prescriptive
role.
a. The Court's Power
One might argue that the Court lacks power to
prescribe solutions to tort-First Amendment problems. Such
prescriptions look a lot like those species of rules that are
called subconstitutional,'" or quasi-constitutional,'97  or
prophylactic,'" or deterrent remedies," or safe harbor rules,"
Andrew Hamilton, who won their fame as free speech heroes by expanding the jury's
role in libel cases. See ALEXANDER, supra note 43, at 22-26.
"6 See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 35, 44-45.
197 See John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1027, 1030 (1974).
198 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984) (describing as
prophylactic the rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which requires police
to warn detainees of their right to remain silent); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules
in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev. 100, 105
(1985) (defining a prophylactic rule as one "that functions as a preventive safeguard to
insure that constitutional violations will not occur," and which therefore may be
invoked even if there may have been no violation of constitutional rights in the case
under review).
1" Like prophylactic rules, these are created for the purpose of deterring
future violations of constitutional rights, but Professor Grano distinguishes them from
prophylactic rules on the ground that they only apply in cases of litigants whose
constitutional right has actually been violated. Id. at 103-04.
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or constitutional incidental rights," ' or constitutional common
law 2 - judge-made rules not found in the Constitution itself
but thought necessary to enforce explicit constitutional
provisions.2 3 The best known and most criticized of the species
is the Miranda rule, requiring police to inform suspects of their
right to counsel and their right to remain silent.'
Some contend such rules are beyond the Court's
powers. 2 Others argue that they are within the Court's power
but, unlike "core" constitutional principles, can be modified by
Congress or the states. °" Others suggest they are a legitimate
"substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules
drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not required
by, various constitutional provisions."2 7 Still others argue that
they are unexceptionable.2 0
One's view of the central or core purposes of the First
Amendment tends to determine one's view of whether First
Amendment limits on tort law are prophylactic rules."0
Professor Monaghan, arguing that prophylactic rules are
permissible only as a species of constitutional common law that
200 See Susan R. Klein, Identifying and (Re)Formulating Prophylactic Rules,
Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1030 (2001).
201 See id.
202 Monaghan, supra note 4, at 3.
211 See David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 190, 202, 208 (1988).
204 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Dickerson v. U.S., 530 U.S. 428
(2000), the Court attempted to fudge the lower court's characterization of Miranda as
"prophylactic" by insisting that "Miranda is a constitutional decision." But of course
that need not mean that it isn't also prophylactic. See infra note 226. For a good
sample of the criticism of Miranda, see the series of articles published in connection
with the symposium entitled Miranda after Dickerson: The Future of Confession Law,
99 MICH. L. REV. 879 (2001).
'0' Justice Scalia, dissenting in Dickerson, charged that the Court's imposition
of "what it regards as useful 'prophylactic' restrictions upon Congress and the States..
. is an immense and frightening anti-democratic power, and it does not exist." 530 U.S.
at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Grano, supra note 198.
26 See Brian K Landsberg, Safeguarding Constitutional Rights: The Uses and
Limits of Prophylactic Rules, 66 TENN. L. REV. 925 (1999).
207 See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 2-3.
208 See Strauss, supra note 203, at 190 (arguing that prophylactic rules are not
exceptional but are a central and necessary feature of constitutional law); Michael C.
Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L.
REV. 267, 455-56 (1998) (arguing that prophylactic rules should be viewed as
prototypes of constitutional jurisprudence, not exceptions).
209 I use here the term prophylactic rules to refer to all of the types of rules
described above. See, e.g., Grano, supra note 198, at 105-06 & n.23 (arguing that the
term should be confined to a subset of the rules the Court has described as
prophylactic). For my purposes here the proposed distinctions are not important.
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can be reversed by Congress, made an ambivalent attempt to
distinguish defamation rules on the ground that they are "true
constitutional rules" of the kind that has been conceded to be
within the Court's power since Marbury v. Madison: "That
defamation in connection with public officials is actionable only
if knowingly or recklessly false impresses me as an
'interpretative' constitutional rule, if the central thrust of the
[F]irst [Almendment is taken to eradicate the law of seditious
libel."" But of course preventing seditious libel is not the
central thrust of the constitutional rules of defamation. If it
ever was, it certainly ceased to be once those rules were
expanded to protect defamation of nongovernmental public
figures.' and private plaintiffs.2 '
Whether one believes protecting falsehood is a core First
Amendment purpose goes a long way toward determining
whether these rules are prophylactic. In some areas - most
notably symbolic speech' and artistic expression - the Court
seems to have expanded First Amendment purposes well
beyond truth-seeking."4 With respect to speech torts, however,
the Court has adamantly rejected the idea that First
Amendment objectives extend beyond the protection of truth.
[Tihere is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither
the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances
society's interest in "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on
public issues. They belong to that category of utterances which "are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality."'
The centrality of the truth-falsity dichotomy in the Court's
approach to speech-tort problems is obvious in its response to
the risk that liability for intentional infliction of emotional
distress might suppress political satire. Although truth or
falsity bears no necessary relation to the existence or severity
of injury or to the value of the satire, the Court firmly anchored
210 Monaghan, supra note 4, at 33.
"' Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (decided together with
Curtis), cert. granted, 389 U.S. 28 (1967) (granting certiorari, reversing, and remanding
for proceedings not inconsistent with Curtis, 388 U.S. 130).
2 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 351-52 (1974).
"3 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
214 See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (holding that
nude dancing is "within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection").
"' Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (citations omitted).
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its response to that dichotomy: Satire that inflicts emotional
distress is unprotected if it contains demonstrably false
statements of fact that could be reasonably misunderstood as
truth.2 "
Under this view of First Amendment purposes, all but
one of the constitutional limitations on defamation and
intentional infliction of emotional distress are clearly
prophylactic. Truthful speech is protected by the rule that a
plaintiff must prove the falsity of the defamatory statement;2"7
all the other rules therefore protect false speech - i.e., speech
that has no First Amendment value - in the belief that it is
necessary to do so in order to avoid chilling truthful speech
that does have First Amendment value.2" Just as Miranda
excludes some confessions that have not been coerced, and
whose use therefore would not violate the actual prohibition of
the Fifth Amendment, so the defamation rules preclude
liability in some cases in which the speech is false and
therefore is not entitled to the actual protection of the First
Amendment.
Of course one might take a broader view of the First
Amendment's purposes. If its goal is to encourage everyone to
speak freely - for purposes such as venting steam and
achieving fulfilment through self-expression, as well as (or in
lieu of) pursuing truth - then protecting falsehoods is not
merely a means to an end. Professor Emerson"9 and Professor
Baker,22 among others, have made eloquent arguments for the
recognition of such purposes. Justice Scalia must have had
such a view in mind when he argued that the Court's rules for
defamation are not prophylactic. He said they are "a measure
of strategic protection" rather than prophylactic rules "because
the Court has viewed the importation of 'chill' as itself a
violation of the First Amendment - not because the Court
thought it could go beyond what the First Amendment
demanded in order to provide some prophylaxis."22' But of
course if the purpose of the First Amendment is to protect
216 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
2,1 See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
218 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964).
219 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7
(1970).
220 See C. EDWIN BAKER, HuMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-54
(1989).
221 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 459 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
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truthful speech, then protecting some falsehoods to prevent
chilling truth is not the end in itself and is indeed prophylactic.
Justice Scalia's argument makes sense only if the chill to be
avoided is something broader than the risk of deterring
truthful speech - for example, the danger of deterring people
from speaking freely falsely.
There is much to be said for the argument that truth is
not the exclusive goal of the First Amendment. In connection
with speech torts, however, the Court does not appear to have
embraced broader goals. That argument therefore cannot
exempt the rules the Court has prescribed for these torts from
the controversy that surrounds prophylactic rules. Given the
vigor of that debate in other contexts, it seems remarkable that
so little attention has been paid to the legitimacy of
prophylactic rules in limiting tort law.
For reasons that will become apparent, I think
prophylactic rules are at least as troublesome here as in other
contexts. But I am not interested in arguing that what the
Court has done so far in prescribing constitutional rules to
limit tort law exceeds its power. For one thing, the Court has
recently reasserted its power, not only to make what it
concedes is a prophylactic rule, but also to prevent Congress
from repealing it. 22 This is an emphatic rejection not only of the
proposition that prophylactic rules are illegitimate, but also of
the view that such rules are within the Court's power only if
the Court recognizes the legislature's power to reject them.2"
Since the rule in question in that case was the most
controversial of all the Court's prophylactic rules, attempting to
persuade the Court to change its mind in a context that has
generated much less criticism strikes me as a quixotic
undertaking.
Secondly, the Court might worry that the lack-of-power
argument threatens too much settled law." ' Many of the
principles of First Amendment jurisprudence that control areas
other than torts look very much like prophylactic rules, too."5
My argument is that prophylactic rules are especially
222 See id. at 444 (holding unconstitutional Congress's attempt to overrule
Miranda).
223 See Landsberg, supra note 206, at 974-75.
2A Cf. Klein, supra note 200, at 1037 ("Constitutional criminal procedure is
rife with prophylactic rules....").
225 "[T]he most significant aspects of first amendment law can be seen as
judge-made prophylactic rules that exceed the requirements of the 'real' first
amendment." Strauss, supra note 203, at 198.
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troublesome in tort law, but the argument that the Court lacks
power to make such rules would be hard to confine to that
sphere.
Finally, I do not want to rest my case on something as
easily contestable as the distinction between "real" or "core"
constitutional principles on the one hand, and prophylactic
rules on the other."' We have seen how easily a rule can move
from the subconstitutional to the "core" category depending on
the definition of the "core" First Amendment concept."7 A rule
can be moved in the other direction too. For example, if the
First Amendment precludes content-based discrimination on
the ground that the government simply has no business
concerning itself with the content of people's speech, the
presumption against content-based regulation would be a core
principle rather than a prophylactic rule. But if one regards the
core First Amendment purpose as being to prevent
discrimination against disfavored messages, the presumption
against content-discrimination becomes just a prophylactic
shield against the "core" evil, viewpoint discrimination.22
In any event, since the Court is the ultimate arbiter of
its power, the success of the lack-of-power argument depends
on persuading the Court to stop what it has been doing. I think
prudential considerations are powerful enough to persuade the
Court to refrain from prescribing detailed solutions to tort-
speech conflicts even if it believes it has the power to do so.22
... See 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 259-60 (3d ed.
2000). Perhaps the ultimate proof of the manipulability of that distinction is the
majority's opinion in Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Justice Scalia points out in his
dissent that the majority in Dickerson, although unwilling to claim that the Miranda
warning is actually required by the constitution itself, argues that it is not a
prophylactic rule because it is "constitutionally based." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 446
(Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority's evasions are especially perplexing because the
question before the Court was "whether Congress has constitutional authority to ...
supersede Miranda," id. at 437 - a question quite different from whether Miranda is
prophylactic. See Monaghan, supra note 4, at 2-3; Landsberg, supra note 206, at 974.
227 See supra text accompanying notes 209-12.
228 See Strauss, supra note 203, at 198-99; see also Dorf & Sabel, supra note
208, at 456.
229 The power and prudence arguments are not entirely distinct, of course; the
existence of strong prudential arguments against exercise of the power might convince
the Court that it could not have been intended, or should not be deemed, to have the
power.
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b. Prudential Arguments
One of the objections to prescriptions, perhaps the
central one, is that they cut all other actors out of the process of
deciding how to protect constitutional values. Prescribed
solutions - at least those that specify what the Constitution
requires rather than what it forbids - tend to be self-executing.
The Court speaks directly: to police, prosecutors, and defense
attorneys, or, in tort, to future litigants. To the extent that
these actors accept the prescriptions as conclusive and self-
sufficient, there is no need for the mediating role of the
legislature or the law-making processes of courts; the Court
becomes the only relevant law-maker. That of course is
precisely why the Court has found prescribed solutions
attractive in situations like Miranda and Sullivan, where the
Court lacked faith in (or patience with) the usual processes of
law.
But bypassing those processes precludes the
experimentation, flexibility, and adaptability that are thought
to be the virtues, not only of federalism but also of the common
law. In other fields, those virtues currently command newfound
respect from the Court. Solicitude for federalism, at least as
against congressional incursions on state sovereignty, is very
much in vogue."° Activism on behalf of constitutional rights,
though still apparent occasionally, 3 ' is generally in disfavor.
For example, the Court has "retreated from [its] previous
willingness to imply a cause of action where Congress has not
provided one," even for constitutional violations." Justice
Scalia says implied constitutional torts are "a relic of the heady
days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to
create [implied] causes of action . . ."" and are even more
objectionable than causes of action implied from statutes "since
an 'implication' imagined in the Constitution can presumably
230 My colleague Louise Weinberg has conveniently collected the major
decisions that exemplify this solicitude in her article, This Activist Court, 1 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 111, 111 n.3 (2002). For commentary on the phenomenon, see, for example,
Michael C. Dorf, No Federalists Here: Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the
Rehnquist Court, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 741 (2000); Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young,
Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 DUKE L.J. 75 (2001).
231 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that statute
criminalizing same-sex sodomy violates liberty right protected by due process).
232 Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 67 n.3 (2001).
233 Id. at 75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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not even be repudiated by Congress."2"' The issues are different,
of course, but if it is wrong for the Court to imply tort remedies
for constitutional violations, we might at least expect the Court
to explain why it is right for it to prescribe solutions for
constitutional violations arising from tort law.
If federalism and the common law are valuable for the
pluralism they bring to bear on such matters as enforcement of
contracts and ownership of property, it is hard to see why we
should applaud their abandonment in the resolution of speech-
tort conflicts. Such conflicts implicate values of the highest
order: freedom of speech and freedom of the press on one side,
and on the other, reputation, honor, privacy, civility, personal
integrity, and physical safety. These are values that may be
weighed differently in various times, places, and
circumstances,"3 as is obvious from the fact that virtually all of
the rest of the world weighs these values differently than we do
in the United States.'
Whatever the merits of prophrlactic rules in other
contexts, excluding the common law courts from the process of
resolving speech-tort conflicts is especially questionable for
several reasons. One is that the peculiarities of the state action
concept in tort cases ought to counsel caution on the part of the
Supreme Court. Another is that there is unlikely to be a single
best solution to such conflicts. Yet another is that the Supreme
Court is not particularly well-equipped to choose the solution.
These difficulties derive from the nature of the constitutional
issue in a tort case. Freedom of expression is a system - not
just of specific rules, but of premises, procedures,
2N Id.35 
235 See MICHAEL CHESTERMAN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AUSTRALIAN LAW: A
DELICATE PLANT 168-91 (2000) (describing disparate values that influence responses to
defamation in various legal systems).
236 The highest courts of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom have all rejected the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to defamation. See Hill
v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, 126 DLR 4th 129 (Supreme Court of Canada 1995);
Lange v. Australian Broadcasting Co., (1997) 189 CLR 520; Lange v. Atkinson, [2000] 3
N.Z.L.R. 385; Reynolds v. Times Newspapers, Ltd., [1999] 3 WLR 1010 (House of
Lords). Article 10 § 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights rejects the idea
that freedom of expression is to be preferred over other interests such as reputation
and privacy. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 10(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
But see Rajagopal v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 264. In Rajagopal, the
Indian Supreme Court followed U.S. precedents with respect to defamation of public
officials, disclosure of private facts contained in public records, and prior restraints on
publication. See generally Susanna Frederick Fischer, Rethinking Sullivan: New
Approaches in Australia, New Zealand, and England, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 101
(2002).
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presumptions, conventions, and predilections.2 7 The same is
true of tort law. It is a system for the resolution of disputes
arising from various kinds of wrongs. Each specific tort has a
body of rules, but also a retinue of premises, procedures,
presumptions, evidentiary tools, and allocations of power
between judges and juries.2"
As I have argued above,239 treating the state's common
law, or a tort judgment based on it, as state action puts the
court reviewing the constitutionality of that state action in an
unfamiliar dual role. It is both the voice of the state and the
judge of the merits of the state's position. Keeping the
constitutional and tort aspects of the solution separate does not
eliminate this problem, but mixing them exacerbates it. State
courts of necessity must decide both tort and constitutional
questions, but the Supreme Court decides only constitutional
questions. When the Court prescribes tort-like solutions under
the rubric of constitutional law, it becomes the articulator and
evaluator of both the free speech concerns and the competing
tort interests. When it refrains from doing so, it preserves the
state court's power to speak for the state's interests as
expressed through the common law - within the limits set by
the Court's constitutional judgment, of course. This does
nothing to alleviate the dual-role problem while the state court
is considering the constitutional questions, but a separation of
roles at the remedial stage is still desirable.
The second reason for skepticism about Court-
prescribed solutions has to do with the nature of the task.
When a tort judgment is challenged on the ground that it
violates the First Amendment, the challenge is rarely confined
to a single specific rule of tort law. The common denominator of
all these cases is the "chilling effect" - the risk that tort
liability will suppress speech by deterring other speakers.2 " The
argument is not that tort law has suppressed the speech of the
litigant invoking the First Amendment;24' claims for damages
237 See EMERSON, supra note 219.
23 See DOBBS, supra note 41, at 10-24 (describing characteristics, methods,
and processes of tort law).
239 See supra text accompanying notes 64-75.
240 Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 889 n. 173 (listing twenty cases in which the Supreme
Court has discussed the chilling effect in connection with defamation).
241 Tort defendants could make nonconsequentialist arguments, for example,
that it is unfair to punish them for engaging in protected speech without regard to the
effect that punishment will have on future speech, but they almost never make these
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are necessarily cases in which the tort law that is under attack
failed to deter the speech. Nor is it necessary for the speaker to
claim that its own future speech will be deterred, and typically
they do not. The claim is that the tort law chills the speech of
others. The validity of the argument depends upon the
likelihood and consequences of liability. That requires an
assessment of all the factors upon which liability is based and
all the factors that will affect the consequences that flow from
liability, including the likely amount of damages and the
maximum possible damages. In other words, it requires a
complete appraisal of the relevant tort law and the system that
administers it.
To resolve a tort-speech conflict, a court must first
determine how the law governing the tort in question -
statutory as well as common law - affects speech. In tort law
generally, and in speech torts specifically, the effects of any
single rule may be exacerbated or ameliorated by its interplay
with other rules. A few examples: (1) The law of negligence
generally requires strict proof of causation - a finding that but
for the defendant's negligent act, the injury would not have
occurred.242 But occasionally, when it is clear the defendant has
been negligent and the nature of the negligence makes it
impossible for the plaintiff to prove but-for causation, the law
permits a plaintiff to proceed on some lesser showing of
causation.242 (2) The basic law of defamation requires no proof of
the defendant's fault,24 ' but it recognizes numerous common law
privileges that prevent plaintiffs from prevailing unless they
show some impropriety or abuse by the defendant to overcome
arguments. A zealous textualist might say that is because the First Amendment only
forbids "abridging" of speech. The only restrictions that literally "abridge" speech are
prior restraints; after-the-fact consequences, such as criminal penalties, "abridge" only
future speech. If the First Amendment forbade the "punishment" of speech, that
language would make it easier to argue that it was a fairness rule, designed to prevent
the injustice of penalizing one who provides the benefits of free speech. The term
"abridge" may suggest a more instrumental purpose for the First Amendment, to guard
against the prospective effects of restrictions on speech.
The explanation that seems more likely to me is that petitioners cast their
arguments in terms of external consequences because they do not expect the Court to
grant certiorari "merely" to prevent unfairness to a litigant.
242 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC
PRINCIPLES) § 26 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2002).
141 Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948), Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d
924 (1980); Ybarra v. Spangard, 208 P.2d 445 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
244 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
claims of privilege.2u (3) In theory the law of libel requires no
proof of actual injury,24 6 but in practice it is difficult to recover
without such proof 2 7 In each of these instances, as in most tort
cases, the outcome is a product of many variables, not all of
which are independent.
This appraisal of the law's effects must include an
appreciation of the interplay between common law and
statutes. Speech torts are predominantly common law causes of
action. Only in rare instances is one established by statute.2 8
Statutes often play a role, however. In some states the common
law rules have been codified;2 1 in these states common law
interpretations often continue to control, however, even to the
extent of trumping statutory language.50 Statutes sometimes
enter the picture by analogy to negligence per se; the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant's violation of a statute resolves as a
matter of law one or more of the elements of the cause of
action.2 5' There are many statutory defenses, some of which
abrogate the common law,52 some of which supplement it,"'3
some of which merely codify it,2  and some of which seem to be
eventually absorbed into the common law.2
245 The Restatement identifies ten absolute privileges and eight conditional
privileges. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Ch. 25 Defamation: Defenses (1977).
246 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346.
247 Anderson, supra note 93, at 502-03.
248 See, e.g., Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 612 N.E.2d 699, 596
N.Y.S.2d 350 (1993) (holding that the tort of invasion of privacy in New York is
governed exclusively by sections 50 to 51 of the Civil Rights Law).
2'9 The best known example is California. See CALIF. CIV. CODE §§ 44-48
(Deering 2003).
250 See, e.g., Dolenz v. Tex. State Bd. Of Med. Exam'rs, 981 S.W.2d 487, 489 &
n.4 (Tex. App. 1998) (relying on Restatement definition of libel rather than statutory
definition). See also Gugliuzza v. K.C.M.C., Inc., 606 So. 2d 790, 792 (La. 1992)
(following common law rule that libel of the dead is not actionable despite state
criminal statute defining libel to include defaming the memory of the deceased).
251 See e.g., Fla. Star Inc. v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 529 (1989) (citing state
court's opinion, 499 So. 2d 883 (1986), in which the Florida District Court of Appeal
held that the defendant's violation of a statute forbidding publication of rape victims'
names established as a matter of law all elements of the plaintiffs claim except
causation and damages).
252 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000) (modifying the common law to grant
Internet service providers complete immunity from liability for republishing
defamation). See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
25 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(e) (Deering 2003) (extending the privilege to
report official proceedings to nonofficial public meetings).
'5 See, e.g., Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, 144 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940) (holding that Texas statute defining libel merely codifies common law).
258 For example, the privilege in defamation law to make a fair and accurate
report of official proceedings is statutory in most states, see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.05 (Anderson 2003), but is now recognized as a matter of common law in other
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It is no simple matter to determine how the law of any
particular tort affects speech.2" It is not enough to evaluate all
of the relevant statutory and common law. Assessing the
likelihood that speech will be chilled requires evaluating not
only the aggregate influence of the system of law, but also the
net effects of all the forces that influence speakers, nonlegal as
well as legal.257 These include not only pressures to self-censor,
but also incentives to speak, such as professional norms (which
seem to provide strong incentives to take risks at the higher
levels of journalism) and market forces (which seem to provide
incentives, perhaps even stronger, at the lower levels).2" As the
Court has recognized in other contexts, speech may sometimes
be hardy and not easily chilled."9 Because it is never possible to
identify and quantify all the variables that militate for or
against publication, chilling effects are necessarily
speculative.2"
Those difficulties arise from the first and easiest step in
solving a tort-speech conflict. The second step, devising an
appropriate solution, is even more difficult because it involves
prediction as well as evaluation. It requires a court to predict
how a proposed solution will change the law's effect on speech.
As Professor Fallon observed in deciding how much defamation
to protect:
[Tihe Court's task [is] not only to balance, in an abstract way, the
First Amendment interest in promoting the free flow of critical
comment against the states' interest in protecting reputation. The
Court also [has] to make more concrete, empirical, and predictive
assessments about the relative proclivity of the press to engage in
self-censorship under alternative liability regimes; about the
proportion of truthful and untruthful assertions that would be
states, see, e.g., Kernick v. Dardanell Press, 236 A.2d 191 (Pa. 1967) (holding
statements made by public officials in their official capacity immune from damages for
defamation unless malice is proven).
256 As Professor Epstein said, "The key to understanding the law of libel is to
view it as an integrated whole, in which the choice of one rule on one issue is heavily
influenced by the rules adopted on another question." Epstein, supra note 4, at 786.
257 Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
"Chilling Effect," 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978).
258 David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422
(1975). For an empirical study of the effects of libel law on media in Great Britain, see
ERIC BARENDT, ET AL., LIBEL AND THE MEDIA: THE CHILLING EFFECT (1997). The
authors conclude that the chilling effect works quite differently on different sizes and
types of media.
219 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
26 See Landsberg, supra note 206, at 971.
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chilled by such regimes; about the harms that would be done by false
speech and the benefits of truthful speech that would be forgone
under various imaginable rules; and about the practical competence
of the courts to administer particular liability standards fairly.
261
Such predictions depend on many factors: how future
litigants interpret the change, whether the lower courts accept
the change enthusiastically or reluctantly, the Court's own
willingness to engage in ongoing supervision to assure
compliance.262 They also depend on external factors: broader
changes in the law," procedural changes," and changes in jury
predilections. They may be affected even more by nonlegal
developments such as changes in the media, in the political
climate, and in public enthusiasm for free speech.
Of course, all legal decisions, like most other important
decisions in public life (and for that matter, private life), have
to be made on the basis of imperfect information. No court or
legislature ever has enough empirical evidence to know what is
the best solution to a speech-tort conflict - but neither do they
know whether punishment deters crime, tort law advances the
general welfare, or free speech promotes democracy. Law
makes most of its choices on the basis of sketchy information,
accumulated wisdom, experience, and intuition.26 The difficulty
of determining how a change in tort law will affect speech is
not a reason for avoiding decisions in tort-speech conflicts. But
it is a reason for skepticism about resolving them with a single,
rigid constitutional rule. Situations that admit of no single
optimal solution, or at least not one that we may confidently
261 See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 54, 63 (1997).
262 The Court vigorously supervised the application of its constitutional rules
for defamation, deciding twenty-seven cases in the twenty-seven years after New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan. See Anderson, supra note 93, at 487 n.2. By way of contrast, the
Court has decided only two cases involving disclosure of private facts. See Cox Broad.
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
263 Examples of broad changes include tort reforms such as restrictions on
joint and several liability and caps on punitive damages.
264 One example is interlocutory appeals. See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 51.014(6) (Vernon 2003) (giving news media right of interlocutory appeal from
denial of summary judgment motions based on First Amendment). Another example is
loser-pays attorney fees. See, e.g., TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 42.004 (Vernon 2003)
(awarding litigation costs, including attorneys' fees, against parties who reject
settlement offers that turn out to be significantly more favorable to them than the
eventual judgment).
265 Professor Lidsky tells me I should add to this list, "sensational anecdotes."
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identify, are precisely those in which the pluralism of
federalism and the common law are most valuable.6
The third reason for doubting the wisdom of excluding
common law courts from the resolution of speech-tort conflicts
has to do with institutional competence. The Supreme Court's
expertise and sensitivity in matters of free speech is
unquestionable. If there is a specialized court for free speech
anywhere in the world, the Supreme Court is it. It sees and
decides every type of First Amendment case, from picketing..
and symbolic speech... to pornography269 and national security.27 6
It is the engine that has driven the development of the
remarkable system of freedom of expression in the United
States. Even when changes in ideology and politics led to
retrenchments in other areas, the Court has not reversed
direction as to free speech.'
In matters of tort law, however, the Court is generally
less expert. It does see bits and pieces of tort law, in maritime
cases 2 and cases based on specific federal statutes274 or some
26 The countervailing consideration, of course, is that the uncertainties of the
common law process are likely to increase the risk of self-censorship. As is often the
case in law, the ultimate choice is between one evil and another.
267 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding state restrictions
on anti-abortion picketing).
2 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)(recognizing constitutional right of high school students to wear black armbands in
protest).
269 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (holding that statute's
reliance on community standards to identify material harmful to minors does not by
itself render statute unconstitutionally overbroad).
270 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)(finding unconstitutional a federal injunction against newspapers prohibiting the
publication of a classified government study); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507(1980) (per curiam) (finding former CIA employee in breach of a fiduciary obligation
when he published certain information without first submitting it to the CIA for
review, as he had agreed).
271 See Lucas A. Powe Jr., The Not-So-Brave New Constitutional Order, 117
HARv. L. REv. 647, 676 (2003) (book review) (stating that under Chief Justice
Rehnquist the Court's free speech jurisprudence "retained a largely Warren Court
slant"). One can never be sure, of course, whether the latest decision against free
speech, see, e.g., U.S. v. American Library Ass'n, Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003), might signal
a change of direction.
272 Of course, the Court acquires expertise when it inserts itself deeply into an
area of tort law, as it has done in constitutionalizing much of the law of defamation.
But the question here is what tort expertise the Court brings to the task of resolving
speech-tort conflicts, not what it can learn on the job.
213 See, e.g., Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990); McDermott, Inc.
v. AmClyde & River Don Castings, Ltd., 511 U.S. 202 (1994); Exxon Co. v. Sofec, Inc.,
517 U.S. 830 (1996).
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other federal claim,275 but tort law is not part of its usual
portfolio. 7' In matters of tort law the state courts in general are
likely to have more information, wider experience, and sounder
intuitions than the Supreme Court, because they deal regularly
with all aspects of the entire tort system. Their view of its
effects may not be first-hand, but it is closer to ground level
than the Court's. It is true that most speech-tort cases involve
specialized bodies of law, such as defamation or invasion of
privacy, that differ substantially from the more general tort
principles that govern most of the tort cases that state courts
see. 7 These torts can be as novel and unfamiliar to state courts
as they are to the Supreme Court. But familiarity with the
entire tapestry of tort law is still useful, because despite their
particularized aspects, these cases nevertheless are part of the
larger tort tradition, share many of the fundamental
assumptions of tort law, and use most of the same methods as
the more familiar torts.27
274 See, e.g., Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000); Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (2000); Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
275 Examples include claims that awards of punitive damages in tort cases are
unconstitutional. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
276 I undertook to count the Court's tort decisions in the five-year period from
1998 through 2002, but abandoned the endeavor because of the difficulty of developing
an objective definition of what counts as a tort case. A search for decisions using the
word "tort," "maritime," admiralty," or "damages" turned up 190 hits but the vast
majority of those are not tort cases by any standard. Some of them, however, could be
classified as tort cases: for example, cases claiming that punitive damage awards are
unconstitutional, invoking immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act or the
Eleventh Amendment, claiming that state tort actions are pre-empted by federal
statutes or regulatory schemes, or invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a remedy for a wrong
that might also be a tort. It is clear to me that the Court sees a fair number of cases in
which tort issues are involved, but that the number of cases in which the Court
actually interprets and applies tort principles is small.
277 The only major subset of speech-tort cases that are likely to be brought on
general tort theories such as negligence are those involving physical harms caused by
speech.
218 Another concern related to institutional competence has to do with political
pressures. If one believes decisions ought to be based on independent judgments about
how best to accommodate speech and tort interests, one has to worry that those
judgments might be distorted by special interests. The interests that have the largest
stake in these decisions are the media and entertainment industries. It is possible that
the Supreme Court is better able than the state courts (particularly those that are
elected) to resist the special pleading of those interests. But my impression is that both
are generally sensitive to those interests, and the only generalization that seems safe
to me is that judicial decisions by courts of either level are preferable to decisions by
legislatures in this regard.
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VI. PRESERVING A ROLE FOR STATE COURTS
A. Leaving Solutions to the States
In an ideal world, responsibility for reconciling tort
liability with the demands of the First Amendment would be
clearly divided. The Supreme Court would decide whether a
tort judgment violates the First Amendment. Identifying the
kinds of speech that require protection, and the degree of
protection required, are at the heart of the Court's
responsibility and competence. There is no reason for the Court
to defer to anyone on these questions. Answering them is part
of the enterprise of deciding what the First Amendment means.
Ideally the Court should not decide how tort law should
be modified to achieve the right level of protection. That should
be left to the state courts. It is a question to which there is
unlikely to be a single right answer, and which therefore is
likely to benefit from the experimentalism of the common law
and federalism. It is a question that can only be answered on
the basis of speculations, intuitions, predictions, andjudgments about the effect that changes in law will have on
potential tortfeasors and those they harm - matters that the
state courts are probably better suited to evaluate than the
Supreme Court.
As a practical matter, such a sharp division of
responsibility would be difficult to achieve, but it is useful
nevertheless to consider how such a regime would work. The
state courts' solutions would be subject to Supreme Court
review, of course; their modifications of tort law might or might
not be sufficient to solve the constitutional infirmity. But by
insisting that solutions originate in the state courts, the Court
in deciding on their sufficiency would have the benefit of ideas
that had been contested, evaluated, and articulated below.
When the Court held a judgment unconstitutional, the case
would go back to the state court for further proceedings to
determine how the tort law should be modified, and on
subsequent review the Court would at least have the benefit of
those proceedings.
Realistically, of course, only a small fraction of the cases
would come back to the Court for a second time. It might be
clear from the Court's initial decision that there is no
modification that could permit the plaintiff to win, in which
case the plaintiff presumably would capitulate or the state
court would render judgment against her if she did not. If the
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initial decision left room for a modification that might permit
the plaintiff to prevail, the defendant would have a substantial
incentive to settle. If there was no settlement and the parties
continued the contest, the state court would provide a solution,
but the losing party might not seek Supreme Court review, and
if she did the Court would be under no obligation to grant it. As
in any other case, even if the Court thought the result
unconstitutional, it might not believe the matter worthy of
certiorari. Thus, by the time the Court reviewed the sufficiency
of state solutions to the constitutional problem, it could have
the benefit of many cases decided by many different courts. It
would also have the benefit of experience: One would expect the
parties and the state courts to adduce whatever evidence could
be found - anecdotal or impressionistic if not empirical - as to
how various solutions had worked.
Obviously, developing constitutionally permissible
common law limitations on tort law under this rigid division of
responsibilities would be slow and uneven. A long period of
trial and error might be required before the acceptable
parameters of liability emerged. However desirable it might be,
complete compartmentalization of roles is for these reasons
impractical. Nevertheless, there are a number of things the
Court could and should do to make the ideal more
approachable.
When the Court holds a tort judgment unconstitutional,
it should attempt to identify as precisely as possible what it is
about the judgment that impermissibly abridges speech.
Asserting that the law on which the judgment is based will
have a chilling effect provides little guidance; all tort law has
chilling effects. It is just as unhelpful to provide a laundry list
of criticisms without indicating which are crucial to the
decision. For example, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the
Court identified eight different complaints about the common
law of defamation. 9 If the Court believes the problem lies in
279 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court asserted that the common law of
defamation (1) requires the defendant to prove truth, thereby subjecting the defendant
to the risk of unprovability, id. at 279; (2) permits judgments far larger than criminal
penalties would be without the safeguards of the criminal process, id. at 277-78; (3)
allows damages to be awarded without proof that the plaintiffs suffered any pecuniary
loss, id. at 267; (4) allows recovery for minor errors in statements that are
substantially correct, id. at 286; (5) causes publishers, because of uncertainties about
the outcome of litigation, to withhold information that in fact would be protected, id. at
279; (6) does not recognize a defense of good faith, id. at 267; (7) allows impersonal
criticism of government to be transmuted into personal libel, id. at 291-92; and (8)
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the cumulative effect of the named defects, 2 it should say so. If
it believes that each of the defects is independently serious
enough to make the judgment unconstitutional,8 ' it should say
that. In yet other cases, the Court may wish to rest its decision
on one or more specific defects but at the same time identify
other defects that might also be fatal; that apparently was the
Court's objective in Sullivan.282 Identifying the problem
precisely is not the same thing as prescribing a solution; it
merely gives the state courts some guidance as to where to look
for possible solutions.
The Court should deal forthrightly with the possibility
that different types of speech might require different levels of
protection from tort liability. The Court has been reluctant to
explicitly endorse variable levels of protection for the
understandable reason that such distinctions can easily be
expressions of personal preference." But in fact, variable
protection is found throughout First Amendment law.
Commercial speech" and indecent speech 85  are familiar
examples of genres of speech that receive some reduced level of
protection. Even categories of speech that were once thought to
receive no protection have morphed into various species of
lesser-protected speech; obscenity, 2 defamation,287 fighting
gives public officials a privilege to defame citizens without a reciprocal privilege for
citizen criticism of officials, id. at 282-83.
280 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), may be an example
of a cumulative-defects case. The Court noted that the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress made no allowance for political satire, attached controlling weight to
the speaker's bad motives, and allowed liability to be predicated on a jury's subjective
determination of "outrageousness." The Court did not indicate whether these objections
were fatal independently or only cumulatively.
281 See e.g., Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537-41 (1989) (identifying "three
independent reasons" why the judgment was unconstitutional).
282 The Court did not adopt rules designed to deal with the issues of minor
errors and difficulty of proving truth in Sullivan, but did so in later cases. See Time
Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767
(1986).
2M3 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In R.A.V., the
majority rejected Justice Stevens's suggestion that the Court should abandon its
categorical approach to content-based restrictions in favor of 'a more complex and
subtle analysis, one that considers the content and context of the regulated speech and
the nature and scope of the restriction on speech." Id. at 428.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
282 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968).
28 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
287 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64 (1964).
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words," and advertising 9  now receive various levels of
protection. It is too late to pretend that because "speech is
speech" it must all be protected equally.
Even within the field of tort liability, we know that
some distinctions between different types of speech are
permissible. Speech about private persons requires less
protection from the law of defamation than speech about public
figures, 90 and speech that is not about matters of public concern
probably requires less than speech that is."0 Beyond that, the
Court has given little guidance. It is unclear, for example,
whether gossip about celebrities' or pornography 3  or
commercial speech" requires the same protection from tort law
as political speech. Whether movies,"5 video games,' and other
forms of entertainment require the same level of protection as
newscasts is a question of large importance in cases involving
copycat crimes, suicides, and other physical harms alleged to
have been caused by speech. Half a century ago, the Court
announced rather grandly that entertainment is "as much
entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of
literature."97 Since then it has distinguished commercial
speech" and pornography' from other forms of protected
speech.
2"8 Compare R.A.V., 505 U.S. 377 (holding that state may not ban cross-
burning done with intent of expressing racial hostility), with Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343 (2003) (holding state may ban cross burning done with intent to intimidate).
289 Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. 557; Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
2w Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
291 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
2'9 See Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905 (1984).
293 Compare Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987)
(majority opinion), with id. at 1025-30 (Jones, J. concurring and dissenting) (arguing
that pornography should not receive the same level of First Amendment protection as
other speech).
294 See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d 539, 548 (5th
Cir. 2001) (holding that defamation requires less First Amendment protection when it
occurs in commercial speech).
295 Byers v. Edmondson, 712 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 1998); Olivia N. v. Nat'l
Broad. Co., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (1981).
See James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (extensively
reviewing the pros and cons of extending First Amendment protection to video games
to protect their maker from liability for wrongful death); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't,
Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002) (dismissing wrongful death claims on the
ground that video games are protected by the First Amendment).
297 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948).
298 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976).
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Whether those choices, made in quite different contexts,
should be the starting point for analysis of tort problems is not
at all clear. For example, the Court has asserted that
commercial speech requires less protection because it is less
easily chilled. If that is so, might not the same be true of
entertainment, at least entertainment that causes death or
serious physical injury? Or if it is not, might the social cost of
chilling creativity in entertainment be different from the costs
of chilling news? How important is the distinction between
truthful speech and falsehood? So important that truthful
speech may never be subjected to tort liability? Or are there
some areas in which the truth of the harmful statement has
little relevance? Truth is irrelevant in cases of extortion and
solicitation, even though the consequence is serious criminal
penalty. Should it also be irrelevant, or at least occupy
something less than the central role that it plays in
defamation, in torts such as interference with contract or
invasion of privacy?"'
If the Court were to decide that certain types of speech
may be given less protection, it should try to explain why that
is so. If entertainment requires less protection than political
speech, is it because the former is less likely to be chilled, or
because entertainment is a less important type of speech and
the chill therefore less objectionable? If some types of truthful
speech are not always protected, is it because those types of
speech lack public importance, or because those are instances
where the truth is the source of the harm?
Some clarity about these premises would be helpful
even if the Court is to continue prescribing its own solutions,
but it is especially important if solutions are to be left to the
state courts. When the Court prescribes its own solutions, it
can avoid answering these questions directly because its
solutions will implicitly reflect the answers. But if
responsibility is to be divided, that option is not available, and
state courts will need to know as specifically as possible how
much protection various types of speech must be given, and
why.
29 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968).
300 Va. Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 & n.24.
301 Even if truth does not preclude liability for torts like these, one can
imagine that courts might conclude that false statements that invade privacy or
interfere with contract might be entitled to less protection than truth.
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Even if the Court took these steps to facilitate the shift
of solution-devising authority to the state courts, practical
difficulties would remain. Some of them have to do with
judicial economy and efficiency. Dividing the responsibility
would increase the amount of litigation required to develop the
boundaries of constitutionally permissible tort liability. That
would impose costs not only on courts, but also on litigants;
they are likely to waste energy and money litigating over the
constitutionality of possible solutions - litigation that is
unnecessary when the Court prescribes the solution. Neither
the decisions of the Supreme Court nor those of the state courts
would be truly final; the former would remain subject to
implementation by the states and the latter would remain
subject to Supreme Court review. There might be confusion as
to how much of a state court's solution was tort law and how
much constitutional law - a risk that does not exist when
everything is decided by the Supreme Court.
Serious as these difficulties are, it should be noted that
they are not entirely different from the inefficiencies that
result from the Court's practice with respect to
unconstitutional statutes. There too, much litigation could be
avoided if the Court would specify the solution by saying how
the statute should be rewritten to make it constitutional. The
Court's refusal to do this means that legislatures have to decide
whether to take another stab at the matter, parties have to
spend energy and money litigating the constitutionality of the
new statute, and courts have to decide more cases to resolve
matters that the Court could have resolved in its initial
decision if it were willing to assume the responsibility of saying
not only what is unconstitutional, but also what would be
constitutional. If that price is worth paying to avoid
trespassing on the legislature's turf, it is not clear why it is not
worth paying to avoid invading the state courts' province.
The question is whether the benefits of leaving
constitutionally required adjustments of tort law to state courts
outweigh the practical difficulties of doing so. One's answer
probably depends on one's level of satisfaction with the results
produced by the present practice of Court-prescribed solutions.
For example, one who thinks the Court's extensive
modifications of the law of defamation are a success will
probably see little reason to shift the job of prescribing
solutions to state courts. On the other hand, if one thinks the
constitutional law of defamation unnecessarily sacrifices
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reputation, civility, or the integrity of public discourse, the
prospect of a different approach may be attractive.
I hasten to add, however, that conclusions as to
defamation should not necessarily be controlling with respect
to other speech torts. As I have acknowledged, the Court is
unlikely to retreat from its aggressive intervention in
defamation. The real question is not whether that model of
intervention should be continued in the field of defamation, but
whether it should be extended to other areas. The Court has
shown some uneasiness about exporting the model, 2 and
rightfully so. Even if aggressive constitutional intervention is
an appropriate response in defamation, it may not be
appropriate in other speech torts. For example, media liability
for physical harms caused by copy-cat crimes and how-to
publications raises a number of issues - such as causation,
foreseeability, and scope of liability - that tort law deals with
constantly but that are rarely the focal point of constitutional
adjudication. 3
B. Palliatives
In principle it makes sense to leave to the state courts
the job of modifying tort law to make it compatible with the
First Amendment. That would require a rather dramatic break
with forty years of Supreme Court practice, however. All who
value the protection of free speech may well be uneasy about
the prospect of exchanging a practice that we know protects
speech fairly reliably for a new one whose reliability would not
be known for years. If the thorough separation of functions
described in the preceding section seems too risky, there are
still a number of ways to encourage state courts to play a larger
role.
Encouraging state courts to provide their own solutions
to speech-tort conflicts is easier said than done. The truth is,
state courts have shown little interest in forestalling Supreme
Court intervention by resolving the problems through tort law.
3" Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (concerning
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)
(concerning statutorily imposed liability for unconsented commercial use of name or
picture of person).
303 See David A. Anderson, Incitement and Tort Law, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.957, 1008 (2002) (applauding fact that by not prescribing a constitutional
straightjacket for physical harm cases, the Court has made it possible for tort law to
continue working out solutions).
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The Court's perceived hegemony in free speech matters seems
to have a paralyzing effect on state courts. When the Court
tells a legislature that its statute is unconstitutional, it throws
down a gauntlet. If the legislature wants to achieve its
objective, it has to look for another way to do so. Whatever
political pressure induced the legislature to act in the first
place may still be active, and there are institutional actors -
staff and committees - whose job it is to consider how to
respond. When the Court holds a common law result
unconstitutional, the gauntlet is rarely picked up. Even when
the Court implicitly invites alternative solutions, the state
courts have not responded vigorously. Those courts have no
power to respond sua sponte, of course, and for reasons that are
by no means clear, the plaintiffs who lose in the Supreme Court
do not seem to be inclined to propose alternatives." State
legislatures and perhaps Congress could also offer solutions,
but they have shown even less interest in doing so. The Court's
decisions, even when they do not actually preclude state
solutions, often have preclusive effect."°
o4 When the Court holds a tort judgment unconstitutional, it almost always
remands "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." We might expect
the plaintiff, who at that point has lost under the theory on which the judgment was
based, to eagerly propose alternative theories that would be "not inconsistent" with the
Court's decision. Rules relating to the amendment of pleadings, estoppel, and res
judicata may preclude plaintiffs from advancing new theories at that stage, however. If
there is no further report of the case, as often happens, it is hard to know what
happened. The plaintiff may have been procedurally precluded from proceeding
further, may have simply been exhausted (financially or otherwise), or may have been
able to advance a sufficiently plausible alternative theory to induce the defendant to
settle. Occasionally subsequent reports reveal that the plaintiff was able to succeed on
an alternative theory. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 680 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1982)
(concerning libel plaintiff, who, despite Supreme Court decision holding that he could
only recover for actual injury because he had not proved actual malice, on retrial
proved actual malice and was allowed to recover presumed and punitive damages). In
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1996), after losing in the
Supreme Court, the plaintiff was able to proceed on an alternative theory but was
ultimately unsuccessful.
The failure of subsequent plaintiffs to offer alternatives to the Court's
solution may have to do with the realities of funding litigation. Contingent-fee lawyers
may be reluctant to bring suits in which success depends on persuading the state
courts to adopt a rule different from the one applied by the Supreme Court in a similar
case. The safe course is to either take the case and try to win it under the existing
Supreme Court precedent or, if that appears unlikely, turn it down. Of course, there
are some clients wealthy enough to pay lawyers to take such gambles, and some
contingent-fee lawyers daring enough or ignorant enough to do so, but the economics of
tort litigation tend to work against the development of alternatives to the solutions the
Supreme Court prescribes.
305 This tendency can be seen in the context of the rule in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Before Miranda was decided, the American Law Institute was at
work on a Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure that would have addressed the
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The following suggestions for enlarging the state courts'
role in resolving speech-tort conflicts must be evaluated
against this backdrop of passivity on the part of the state
courts. All require changes in the Supreme Court's approach to
such cases. Some of these comport with conventional ideas
about good judicial practice and should be noncontroversial,
whereas others are more contestable.
1. Proceed Incrementally
The Court should, and usually does, invalidate a tort
judgment on a narrow ground even when it believes there may
also be broader grounds for objection. The Court has done this
scrupulously with respect to the tort of invasion of privacy.
Twice it has been asked to hold that states may not impose
liability for truthful disclosures of privacy-invading
information, and both times it has left that question open,
holding the judgment unconstitutional on narrower grounds." '
Proceeding incrementally at least gives states an opportunity
to revise their tort law in ways that may make it constitutional
by the time the Court has to face the broader question."' This
will prove inefficient, of course, if the Court eventually
determines that the tort cannot be made compatible with the
First Amendment. When the Court is certain that is true, it
problem of coerced confessions by allowing police to question a suspect for four hours
without a lawyer, provided the session was tape recorded. Miranda had been argued,
though not decided, by the time the ALI was scheduled to act, and the pendency of that
decision persuaded the Institute not to vote. After the decision came down, the ALI
abandoned its proposal and eventually adopted a provision that required the Miranda
warning. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § 120.8 (1975). The history of the interplay between the ALI and the Court
on this issue is recounted in LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 392-94 (2000).
301 In a very general way, my suggestions are similar to those my colleague
Susan Klein makes with respect to prophylactic rules in constitutional criminal
procedure. She argues that the Court should refrain from creating such rules unless it
clearly identifies the constitutional mandate and explains the necessity for them,
should act only after it has given other governmental actors an opportunity to solve the
problem, and should be frank about the nature of any rule it makes so other actors can
know whether modification is permissible. See Klein, supra note 200, at 1031.
307 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524 (1989).
300 See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding
that since the Supreme Court had declined to broadly restrict the tort law of invasion
of privacy, the federal court applying state law should assume that the Court's
decisions leave some room for such liability and should assume state courts would
construe common law sufficiently narrowly to avoid constitutional infirmity).
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should so hold." ' But as long as redeeming the tort remains a
realistic possibility, it is better to err on the side of inefficiency
to avoid foreclosing constitutionally acceptable solutions.
2. Do Not Invent Solutions
As mentioned above,"' the Court has sometimes
invented solutions that were neither proposed by the litigants
nor considered by the state courts. At the very least, the Court
should abandon this practice and try to adhere to the judicial
convention of choosing among the options presented by the
litigants. The wisdom of not considering questions not decided
by the courts below is widely accepted because of the obvious
desirability of giving the Court the benefit of the advocacy and
analysis of the parties and the lower courts. It is no less
desirable to have their input in crafting solutions once the
decision as to constitutionality is made.
A rather draconian way to enforce this convention would
be to insist that the question of solutions be litigated in every
case challenging the constitutionality of a tort judgment. The
Court could do this by refusing to reverse tort judgments
unless the petitioner offers a constitutionally acceptable
solution (or persuades the Court that there is no
constitutionally permissible alternative). That would force
litigants to contest, and the state courts to address, ways of
limiting tort law before the case reaches the Supreme Court."'
But giving defendants the burden of proposing solutions would
be impractical and probably unfair. Asking them to think of
ways to protect the interests of prospective plaintiffs whose
claims might be compatible with the First Amendment does not
309 For example, the Court might well determine at the outset that the First
Amendment would never permit liability for physical harms resulting from fully
protected speech to be imposed on nothing more rigorous than ordinary negligence
principles.
31n See supra text accompanying notes 169-71.
311 The present practice may encourage defendants to claim the broadest
possible immunity (e.g., that the First Amendment protects the speech in question no
matter what the basis of liability), knowing that if the Court rejects that argument, but
believes the judgment is unconstitutional, it is likely to adopt sua sponte some more
limited solution that still protects the defendant. This would enable defendants to
devote all their attention to showing the tort's impact on speech, leaving to the Court
the task of reconciling that with the interests protected by the tort. If plaintiffs do not
appreciate the likelihood that the Court will choose a solution sua sponte, they are
likely to devote all their energy to opposing the defendant's broad theory, naively
supposing that if they persuade the Court to reject the basis on which defendant
attacks the judgment they will win the case.
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fit comfortably in the adversary model of litigation. And such a
requirement could sometimes require affirmance of
unconstitutional burdens on speech: Defendants who failed to
present an acceptable solution would lose, whatever the merits
of their claims in other respects.
A more realistic alternative is to take seriously the
opportunities that remand offers. Even when the Court thinks
it knows the right solution, it should treat that as only a
proposal, remanding the case with an invitation to the litigants
and the state courts to react to the Court's proposal. If the
Court believes its solution is the only acceptable one, it can
make that clear without foreclosing the possibility that there
are objections or alternatives that the Court has not
considered. The Court's standard practice of remanding even
when its decision leaves only one course open to the court
below is a pro forma acknowledgement of this possibility;
before prescribing a solution to a tort-speech conflict, the Court
should treat the possibility as real. It should explicitly invite
the consideration of alternatives on remand.
3. Prescribe Only Default Solutions
One way the Court can emphasize that its invitation to
offer alternatives is real is to make clear that its prescription is
only a default solution. As we have seen, the Court's solutions
tend to preempt the field even when they do not explicitly or
logically preclude other approaches.312 If the Court wishes to
encourage tort solutions more aggressively, it could specify that
whatever First Amendment limitation it announces is required
only if the state does not provide some other constitutionally
satisfactory limitation as a matter of tort law.
This is really just a way of emphasizing that the Court's
solution is not exclusive, of course, and there is plenty of room
for skepticism as to whether it would succeed in stimulating
state courts to act.313 But it has the virtue of making the state
312 See supra text accompanying notes 304-05.
313 The Court explicitly invited legislative alternatives to the Miranda rule:
"Congress and the States are free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege
(against self-incrimination), so long as they are fully as effective as those described
above in informing accused persons of their right to silence and in affording a
continuous opportunity to exercise it." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966).
None have materialized in nearly forty years, despite widespread complaints about the
rule. See POWE, supra note 305, at 392-94. Congress did respond to Miranda by passing
18 U.S.C. § 3501, but that was simply an attempt to legislatively overrule Miranda, not
an attempt to offer an alternative. See U.S. v. Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428, 431 (2000).
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court aware of its opportunity to play a role in resolving
speech-tort conflicts and of the limitation on its tort law that
will result if it chooses not to do so. In addition to providing a
rule of decision that controls unless and until the state court
acts, the Court's default solution gives the state court an
example indicating the degree of protection the Court believes
is required.
Unlike a more general statement of openness to
alternatives, a declaration that the Court is only prescribing a
default solution makes the question of alternatives an explicit
issue on remand. Once the Supreme Court holds a judgment
unconstitutional, offers a default solution, and remands, the
state court has to decide whether to accept the Supreme
Court's solution or tackle the issue itself. Under conventional
notions of the judicial role, the initial decision is the plaintiffs,
not the court's, and this limits the court's ability to respond to
the Supreme Court's invitation. The state court will consider
alternative solutions only if the plaintiff proposes them, and
the plaintiff will be likely to do so only if she can articulate one
or more that she believes will allow her to prevail. Plaintiffs
cannot be expected to expend much money and effort to
advance solutions that might preserve possibilities of liability
but only for other potential plaintiffs, and defendants have no
incentive to propose such alternatives for the benefit of either
current or future plaintiffs. That is an inherent weakness of
the common law's reliance on the self-interest of litigants.
When state courts are acting on remand from the
Supreme Court, however, in theory they need not be quite so
constrained by the parties' choices as they are on the initial
appeal. The case before them now includes the Court's
invitation to explore alternatives. If the Supreme Court is the
keeper of the Constitution, the state courts are the keepers of
the common law. Their job is not merely to decide cases, but to
do so in ways that serve the societal interests that the common
law aims to protect. That is why their opinions aim to maintain
the integrity and rationality of the common law, even against
the wishes of the parties if that is necessary.314 Devising
solutions not proposed by the parties is not something state
114 For example, no self-respecting state court would consider itself bound to
embed a particular rule in the state's common law just because the parties agreed to do
so; the court might accept the parties' agreement for purposes of resolving the case, but
it would reserve for itself the right to decide whether the matter agreed upon is really
the law.
[Vol. 69:3
2004] FIRST AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS ON TORT LAW 823
courts do routinely, but their reluctance to do so may be
weakened if the alternative is to accept a Supreme Court
solution that also was not proposed by the parties.
The objective is not to replace one court's unlitigated
inventions with another's, however. State courts should use the
means at their disposal to secure the benefits of advocacy in
deciding whether there are tort law alternatives that will
satisfy First Amendment demands. These might include
specifying issues the court wants the parties to brief and argue,
permitting intervention by other parties, and inviting amicus
briefs.
For simplicity's sake, I have argued as if the only choice
is between First Amendment solutions by the Supreme Court
and tort law solutions by state courts. At this point it should be
obvious that the choice is not quite that stark. While the
Supreme Court lacks power to promulgate tort solutions,"5 the
state courts can offer their solutions either as constitutional
law or as tort law. They have full power to interpret the federal
Constitution, as long as they do so consistently with the
Supreme Court's interpretations. Thus, when the Supreme
Court invites state courts to offer alternatives, the latter could
respond in either tort law or constitutional law. If the state
court modifies the tort law so that it no longer violates the
First Amendment, the constitutional issue simply disappears.
There might be circumstances, however, in which either the
Supreme Court or the state court believes that although
alternative solutions are possible, all should have
constitutional force."6 Because of the preference for tort law
that underlies this entire Article, I would lean toward a
presumption that the Supreme Court is inviting tort
alternatives and that the solutions offered by the state courts
are tort solutions. But that should be left to further exploration
by the courts and commentators. The choice implicates many of
the competing considerations discussed above: the uniformity
and stability of constitutional solutions on the one hand, and
the flexibility and adaptability of tort law on the other. One can
31 See supra text accompanying notes 132-38
316 The possibilities for more speech-protective state interpretations of the
First Amendment are largely unexplored by the states, but there is a significant
literature. See, e.g., Lawrence Gene Sager, State Courts and the Strategic Space
Between Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985); Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, Our Judicial Federalism, 35 CASE WESTERN L. REV. 1 (1984);
Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 605 (1981).
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envision that a considerable jurisprudence might develop
around the matter of deciding when a solution should be
constitutionalized.
VII. CONCLUSION
This is not a propitious moment to advocate a larger
role for tort law. The mood of the time is to shrink tort law, not
expand it. And there is never a good time to argue for a
judicially-implemented reform that is not likely to be embraced
by litigants because it does not enhance either side's chances of
winning. Abolishing all liability for harms caused by speech is
probably a suggestion more congenial to the tastes of the
moment; it is certainly one that would have an enthusiastic
constituency among tort defendants. As I have suggested, that
may even be the right response; it may be impossible to
reconcile the loose culture of tort law with the tight demands of
First Amendment law."7 But if that is to be the outcome, it
should be arrived at forthrightly, by conscious decisions to
sacrifice values like reputation and privacy in the interest of
free speech, and not by a progression of decisions that
ostensibly preserve tort law while immobilizing it in a
straightjacket of constitutional rules, as has happened with the
law of defamation."8
If tort liability for speech is not to be abolished, there
will be tort-speech conflicts that will be resolved by tort-like
rules. It seems clear that state courts should have a role in
this. I doubt that any one model can produce the right
apportionment of responsibility in every situation. Just as
there is unlikely to be a single "right" substantive solution to
conflicts between the objectives of tort law and those of free
speech, so it is unlikely that there is a single best methodology
for the Supreme Court to employ when it determines that a
tort judgment violates the First Amendment. As in choice of
law, the answer may lie not in a single rule, but in developing
317 See supra Part IV.
318 Only one plaintiff won a libel verdict against a media defendant in 2002 in
the entire United States. That award of $225,000 is on appeal. Of the five libel cases
that were tried through to a verdict in 2002, four were won by the media defendants. In
the twenty years from 1980 through 1999, plaintiffs won awards that survived appeal
in only ninety-one cases, an average of fewer than five per year. These figures were
compiled by the Media Law Research Center, a media-funded organization that tracks
libel litigation for the industry. See Press Release, Trial Records Set in 2002: Highest
Media Victory Rate, Lowest Number of Trials, at
http://www.ldrc.com/PressReleases/bull2003-2.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2004).
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principled methods for choosing a rule. At present the Court
uses several different approaches, but articulates virtually
nothing about the bases for those choices."9
The Court should acknowledge that it has a number of
options once it finds a tort judgment unconstitutional, ranging
from simply declaring that to be so, to prescribing an elaborate
set of constitutional rules that supplant the offending tort
rules. It should recognize that the more detailed its response,
the less room is left for state courts to contribute to the
resolution by modifying tort law. In choosing a response, the
Court is weighing the benefits of federalism and the common
law process, which are best served through the tort process,
against those of uniformity and certainty, which are best
served by constitutional solutions. Considerations of efficiency
and effective enforcement will usually counsel a more
aggressive role for the Court, while considerations of
experimentation, adaptation, flexibility, and institutional
competence will usually recommend a more cautious role.
If I were making the decisions, I would indulge a slight
presumption in favor of tort solutions. People who have less
confidence in the tort system might think the preference should
go the other way. But whatever the Court's predilection, when
it chooses a method of resolving speech-tort conflicts it should
evaluate these considerations openly and attempt to articulate
its reasons for favoring one set of values over the other.
The Court should recognize that its decisions become
relatively immutable in a world in which most everything else
mutates rapidly. The world of politics and media in which
Sullivan was decided - a world in which local politicians and
$500,000 judgments were plausibly believed to pose a seriousthreat to a major newspaper"' - no longer exists today."' Yet
the elaborate net of protections that the Court created then, on
319 A rare exception is Justice Powell's opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 343-44 (1974), in which he briefly discusses the choice between ad hoc
resolution and broad rules of general application. He resolves the matter with the
conclusory assertion that ad hoc resolution "would lead to unpredictable results and
uncertain expectations, and it could render our duty to supervise the lower courts
unmanageable" - which does little to explain why the Court finds that approach
preferable in cases involving invasion of privacy and interference with trade relations.
Id. at 343.
320 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION:
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN AMERICA 82-83 (1991).
"' See C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving Up On Democracy, 54
FLA. L. REV. 839 (2002); David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429
(2002).
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the basis of its assessment of chilling effects in that world,
remains unchanged even though that assessment would surely
look much different now, when libel defendants are likely to be
owned by the most powerful entities in the world. and are not
easily intimidated by anyone.
The challenge of finding a principled way to reconcile
tort liability with the First Amendment arises from the nature
of the issue. In the end, the question that must be answered is
always: How much chill is too much? When the Court
prescribes its own solutions it avoids the need to articulate an
answer. The choice of a solution - say, actual malice - implies
that the Court knows the answer and that the chosen solution
will reduce the chill by the right amount. Of course neither is
necessarily true. Actual malice, or any other solution,
represents a guess - an intuition, if you prefer - as to what
amount of chill will survive and how it will affect speech. The
specificity of the Court's response conceals the uncertainty of
its premises. But if responsibility is to be shared, the Court has
to try to articulate the amount of chill-reduction it wants the
state courts to aim for.
Answers to the how-much-is-too-much question can only
be conclusory. The ultimate answer, the one that really
matters, is the one that comes at the end of the Supreme
Court's opinion: "affirmed" or "reversed." That is true even with
Court-prescribed solutions like actual malice; the Court cannot
always explain convincingly why one judgment chills speech
too much and another does not.3 If the Court left solutions to
the state courts, the answer would still be conclusory. The state
court would prescribe but the Supreme Court would review,
and the acceptability of the state court's judgment as to how
much chill is too much would still depend ultimately on the
Supreme Court's intuition. But under the present practice, in
too many cases no one else's intuition is brought to bear on the
matter.
322 For example, ABC is owned by Disney, NBC by General Electric, and CBS
by Viacom. See Anderson, supra note 321, at 455.
3 Compare, e.g., Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967)
(finding candidate failed to show actual malice), with Harte-Hanks Communications,
Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1984) (finding candidate had shown actual malice).
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